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Multilateral treaties today increasingly touch on subjects where there is existing 
domestic law in the United States. In the U.S. federal system, this domestic law may 
not be national law, but law of the constituent U.S. States. However, in light of Article 
VI of the U.S. Constitution, treaties in their domestic application unavoidably 
federalize the subjects they address. The most sensitive issues arise when a treaty focuses 
on matters primarily or exclusively dealt with in the United States at the State or local 
level. Although U.S. practice allows for some flexibility to accommodate State/local 
interests, the federal government reserves the authority to compel compliance in case a 
State adopts a rule contrary to an international agreement which would place the United 
States in breach of its international obligations. This Article examines the role 
constituent States in the U.S. system can play in treaty implementation. The subject is 
of interest to determine the conditions under which State authority might be considered 
for undertaking and implementing U.S. treaty obligations. This Article examines the 
processes under which subnational implementation of international treaties can be 
brought to fruition and when it fails; when there are Uniform Law Commission 
products and drafting expertise available to facilitate implementation at the State level; 
and whether these approaches might enhance the ability of the United States to 
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I. SITUATING THE STUDY 
 
Due to its federal structure, the United States increasingly confronts 
an issue not faced by most other countries, particularly those with unitary 
structures in which the central government possesses all legislative (or 
law-making) power: how to implement its treaty obligations effectively 
and in accordance with its government principles of federalism. The issue 
may not be readily apparent to those lacking a clear understanding of the 
U.S. constitutional structure. It is deeply consequential, however, and in 
recent years has generated a new (and somewhat debatable) phenomenon: 
implementation of U.S. treaty obligations by subnational (i.e., State and 
local) mechanisms. 
In the United States, the treaty power is reserved exclusively to the 
federal government. Treaties are “made” by the President, by and with 
the consent of the Senate.1 The constituent States are in fact expressly 
prohibited by the Constitution from entering into “any Treaty, Alliance, 
or Confederation” and “without the Consent of Congress . . . into any 
Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.”2 In 
its famous Missouri v. Holland decision, the U.S. Supreme Court observed 
that the Constitution expressly delegates the entirety of the treaty power 
to the federal government, to the exclusion of the States.3 
“Treaties”4 are thus creatures of the national government; they 
constitute (and are governed by) federal law. Under Article VI, clause 2 
of the Constitution, once they have been ratified and brought into force, 
they form part of the “supreme law of the land,” equivalent to federal 
statutes, binding on the States and pre-empting contrary State law (“the 
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding”).5 
Although it is generally agreed today that the Founders must have 
intended treaties to be directly effective, at least with respect to the 
                                               
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
2. Id. cl. 1-3. 
3. 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). 
4. For present purposes, the term “treaty” is used in its domestic (Article II) sense, and not in 
the broader context of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which would include 
“executive agreements” and other types of written international undertakings between states and 
governed by international law. 
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. One of the main reasons the second clause of Article VI was 
included in the Constitution was the failure of the “States” under the Articles of Confederation to 
give effect to obligations of the new United States under the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which inter alia 
obliged the country to recognize the lawful contracted debts of the Loyalists (the U.S. agreed to 
“earnestly recommend” to state legislatures that they recognize the rightful owners of all confiscated 
lands and to “provide for the restitution of all estates, rights, and properties, which have been 
confiscated belonging to real British subjects”). 
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constituent States (their governments, legislatures, and courts),6 the U.S. 
Supreme Court added a major complication in a pair of decisions in the 
early 19th century by distinguishing between treaties that are “self-
executing” (meaning directly applicable in all courts, including with regard 
to the resolution of private disputes) and those that are not self-executing 
(meaning that to be effective and enforceable in domestic law they require 
federal implementing legislation).7 
Increasingly, treaties have addressed issues on which a substantial 
body of domestic law already exists (in the form of constitutional 
provisions and doctrine, enacted State and federal legislation, and copious 
judicial decisions). Indeed, multilateral treaties today rarely address 
subjects where there is no domestic law. In the U.S. federal system, the 
relevant domestic law may not be federal (national) but rather law of the 
several constituent States.8 Because of a strong political preference, 
especially in the U.S. Congress, to resolve any differences between 
existing law and the treaty obligations by means of enacted legislation (as 
opposed to direct application of the treaty itself), the practice has emerged 
of ratifying such treaties on a non-self-executing basis, leaving 
implementation to the legislature. In addition, the Senate can condition 
its approval with “reservations” to those parts of the treaties that clearly 
conflict with constitutional provisions (in particular, the protections of 
the Bill of Rights) or existing legislative provisions that are clearly 
inconsistent with the relevant treaty obligations. Some reservations 
contain the caveat that the reservation could be removed if and when the 
conflict had been resolved through subsequent legislation, although this 
is not an option for constitutional conflicts. 
In an effort to mitigate the concerns raised by federalization, various 
approaches to treaty implementation have been adopted. When the treaty 
touches on a subject that clearly falls within the federal purview (such as 
the regulation of civil aviation, as was the case with the 1929 Warsaw 
Convention), implementation by either self-execution or through 
                                               
6. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796) (Chase, J.) (“A treaty cannot be the supreme law 
of the land, that is of all the United States, if any act of a state legislature can stand in its way.”); cf. 
Carlos Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM J. INT’L L. 695, 698-99 (1995) 
(“The history of the Supremacy Clause thus shows that its purpose was to avert violations of treaties 
attributable to the United States, and that the Founders sought to accomplish this goal by making 
treaties enforceable in the courts at the behest of affected individuals without the need for additional 
legislative action, either state or federal.”); John Quigley, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1087-1102 (1992) (same). 
7. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 89 (1833); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
253, 314 (1827). 
8. David P. Stewart, Recent Trends in U.S. Treaty Implementation, in SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND?: 
DEBATING THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS OF TREATIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES LEGAL 
SYSTEM 234 (Gregory H. Fox, Paul R. Dubinsky & Brad R. Roth eds., 2017). 




legislation does not raise the issue.9 However, in some instances, 
multilateral treaties have been adopted on a self-executing basis even 
though their implementation would also necessarily implicate, preempt or 
impact State law and enforcement to some degree, for example, the 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) and the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (both of which of course rest on 
strong federal authority – regulation of foreign commerce in the one case, 
and foreign relations in the other). In these cases, the treaties were 
adopted as self-executing as they clearly implicate international interests 
properly regulated under the treaty power. Nevertheless, some of these 
treaties have worked better in practice than others. 
The most sensitive issues arise when the treaty in question focuses on 
matters primarily or exclusively dealt with at the State or local level. In a 
few such instances, the treaties have been adopted on the basis that they 
will be implemented through State law (either legislation or other 
governmental action or litigation). U.S. practice has shown some 
flexibility in order to accommodate State or local interests (and to rely on 
State or local law and procedural mechanisms to give effect to the treaty 
requirements) while also implementing important international interests. 
In such cases, however, it has been standard practice for the federal 
government to include some type of “fallback” mechanism reserving to 
the federal executive the necessary authority to compel compliance in the 
event a State adopts a contrary rule. Such a provision is necessary to 
ensure that the United States does not fail to comply with its international 
treaty obligations.10 
That fundamental concern explains why the federal government has 
not been prepared (to date, at any rate) to rely entirely on enforcement 
through State or local implementation.11 On a few occasions, however, 
the executive branch has adopted some form of joint implementation, 
involving “parallel” measures to give effect to the treaty at both State and 
federal levels (with the necessary “fallback” safeguards). These occasions 
have involved subjects that normally fall within the purview of the States 
rather than the federal government. 
                                               
9. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation 
by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000. 
10. The international law rule is that a state may not excuse or justify its failure to carry out its 
international treaty obligations on the basis that its internal (domestic) law is inadequate or prevents 
it from complying. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
11. The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Family Maintenance and Other 
Forms of Child Support comes close, with the substantive provisions of the Convention set forth 
in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, adopted by every State, and federal involvement 
(beyond ratification) limited to legislation conditioning federal support for child support collection 
efforts on enactment of the Uniform Act. 
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As the international community increasingly addresses (and adopts 
instruments concerning) matters that in the United States are typically 
regulated by the States rather than the federal government, these issues 
become more sensitive for the United States. Must treaties always and 
inevitably “federalize” the subjects they deal with? When and how can the 
federal government acquiesce in treaty implementation at the State and 
local level without unduly risking international liability in the event of 
non- compliance? More topically, when can States and local governments 
“adopt” international obligations even though the federal government has 
not ratified those treaties or otherwise accepted their obligations as 
binding? If so, what are the implications for the United States at the 
international level? 
This Article examines these issues from both the political science and 
legal perspectives. The legal academic literature on the topic of 
subnational treaty implementation (particularly in the field of human 
rights) has grown.12 Yet the evidentiary record on State and local 
implementation of treaties is spotty, and there is room for careful 
empirical research and documentation describing the extent and contours 
of this phenomenon; on this basis, doctrinal conclusions can be drawn 
and recommendations made. Separately, a considerable body of literature 
                                               
12. See, e.g., Thalia González, From Global to Local: Domestic Human Rights Norms in Theory and 
Practice, 59 HOW. L.J. 373, 378-80 (2016) (arguing scholarship would greatly benefit from new 
studies that embrace on-the-ground specificity in order to better understand how human rights 
ideas translate themselves into behavior at subnational and national levels); Risa E. Kaufman, “By 
Some Other Means”: Considering the Executive’s Role in Fostering Subnational Human Rights Compliance, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1971, 1978-80 (2012) (arguing the federal executive can play a greater role in 
fostering compliance with human rights treaties at the state and local level); Johanna Kalb, The 
Persistence of Dualism in Human Rights Treaty Implementation, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 73-74 (2011) 
(identifying strategies for promoting broader subnational participation in implementing the ratified 
human rights instruments and for engaging states and cities with the United States' international 
obligations); Gaylynn Burroughs, More Than An Incidental Effect on Foreign Affairs: Implementation of 
Human Rights by State and Local Governments, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 411, 415 (2006) 
(arguing constitutional jurisprudence should develop to allow state and local governments to enact 
both inward- and outward-looking human rights legislation); Lesley Wexler, Take The Long Way 
Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 
(2006) (examining how sub-federal actors may undertake a treaty integrating role even as the federal 
government ignores or abandons the particular treaty); Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: 
Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 
245, 249-51 (2001) (proposing an intergovernmental approach to the allocation of authority 
between federal and sub-federal systems in the implementation of international human rights law). 
But see Margaret E. McGuinness, Treaties, Federalism, and the Contested Legacy of Missouri v. Holland, in 
SUPREME LAW OF THE LAND? DEBATING THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS OF TREATIES WITHIN 
THE UNITED STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 179 (Gregory H. Fox, Paul R. Dubinsky & Brad R. Roth 
eds., 2017) (examining the effect of federalism on the making and enforcement of treaties in the 
United States); Noha Shawki, Book Review, 72 J. POL. 1259 (2010) (discussing a political-science 
orientation). 




exists on subnational activity in international law, examining issues of legal 
pluralism, regulatory coordination, and horizontal federalism.13 
The study of how domestic legal institutions and processes interact 
with international law and specifically treaty law has produced a rich 
interdisciplinary literature that draws on social science research methods. 
Studies to understand how human rights treaties work in various political 
and legal systems paved the way.14 These studies added domestic 
institutional and political dimensions to the earlier and more traditional 
focus on how international law is treated in national constitutions.15 
Studying how domestic politics, processes, and institutions receive 
and implement international law has also brought us closer to those who 
are responsible for discharging these obligations. The increased need to 
create and to adopt international treaties governing areas that were 
primarily domestic grows out of recognition that a common approach is 
desirable to handle the volume of matters and number of approaches in 
specific private and commercial transactions around the world.16 
The focus of this Article is on the role that constituent States in the 
U.S. system play in treaty implementation through their legislative 
authority and otherwise. The subject is of interest to determine the 
conditions under which State interests and authority might most 
appropriately be taken into consideration for implementing U.S. treaty 
obligations. When international law tracks existing State law and practice, 
domestic U.S. implementation can be facilitated. We examine the 
advantages of relying on existing law or existing State administrative 
structures (e.g., courts) to implement international treaty obligations. 
                                               
13. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky, Rethinking the Geography of Local Climate Action: Multi-Level Network 
Participation in Metropolitan Regions, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 173, 176-77 (considering how the multilevel 
climate network participation could be more effective in encouraging additional local action); Hari 
M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. 
L. REV. 237, 241-43 (2011) (proposing greater attention be given to the “diagonal” quality of an 
administration’s regulatory interactions); Robert B. Ahdieh, When Subnational Meets International: The 
Politics and Place of City, State, and Province in the World, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 339, 340 (2008); 
Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. REV. 1105, 
1133-34 (2008) (examining horizontal federalism); Robert B. Ahdieh, From Federalism to Intersystemic 
Governance: The Changing Nature of Modern Jurisdiction, 57 EMORY L.J. 1, 4-5 (2007) (attempting to 
systematize the exploration of cross-jurisdictional engagement). 
14. See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS (Cambridge University Press, 2012) (exploring why domestic entities commit 
to and comply with international human rights treaties); Emilia Justyna Powell & Jeffrey K. Staton, 
Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violations, 53 INT’L STUD. Q. 149 (2009) (arguing 
that the effectiveness of the domestic judiciary influences the way states implement treaties). 
15. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Svitlana Chernykh, & Zachary Elkins, 
Commitment and Diffusion: How and Why National Constitutions Incorporate International Law, 2008 
U. ILL. L. REV. 201 (2008) (describing international law on the constitutional level). 
16. Conventions, Protocols, and Principles, HAGUE CONF. PRIV. INT’L L., 
https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions (last visited Dec. 25, 2019) (listing treaties 
since 1951). 
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Using existing legal and political infrastructures to carry out 
international obligations is likely to be less costly and disruptive than 
creating new and separate governing systems to support specific 
international legal obligations.17 The purpose of this Article is to 
understand when State legislation and other collective State action might 
most appropriately play a role in discharging this function. It examines 
the processes under which subnational implementation of international 
treaties occurs with the goal of identifying the conditions under which 
such an approach can be successful. Accordingly, we examine situations 
that have achieved success as well as ones that proved incomplete or 
failed. 
We begin, however, with a discussion of the broad framework under 
which subnational implementation of international law occurs. This 
discussion involves a brief look at so-called normative and operating 
systems in international law, with the former representing the prescriptive 
elements that regulate behavior and the latter addressing the institutions 
and process of implementation. A gap is created when the operating 
system, through its international or domestic institutions and processes, 
is unable to implement or give effect to an international obligation (a part 
of the normative system).18 We consider if subnational implementation in 
the United States is a way to narrow this gap for the United States thereby 
enabling more international obligations to be carried out and to have their 
intended impact. We then move to a description of subnational 
implementation in the United States and a brief elucidation of similar 
situations in other countries, indicating the U.S. context is not sui generis. 
We end with some conclusions on how best to engage States in the treaty 
process to provide the level of State participation that would allow for 
greater U.S. participation in multilateral treaties without federalizing the 
subject area. 
II. WHY SUBNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS? 
 
Some areas of international agreement and commitment obviously 
concern critical aspects of international relations that, in the U.S. system, 
fall exclusively within national competence. Examples include matters 
relating to national security such as arms control and the waging of war, 
                                               
17. In either case, the solution would need to comply with the provisions of Article VI, cl. 2 
of the U.S. Constitution and ensure that the federal government could carry out its constitutional 
(and international) responsibilities for treaty-making, implementation, and compliance. See U.S. 
CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2. 
18. See generally PAUL F. DIEHL & CHARLOTTE KU, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2010). 




international trade, and diplomatic relations including the recognition of 
foreign states and governments. Increasingly, however, international legal 
obligations are likely to require performance or implicate the existing law 
at the subnational or local level — for instance, issues related to 
enforcement of child custody and support orders issued by foreign 
governments, foreign requests for information relevant to proceedings in 
foreign courts, and the like. 
One critical measurement is the degree to which the international 
obligation is or is not implemented effectively. It cannot be assumed, for 
example, that direct implementation (i.e., through self-execution as federal 
law) is necessarily “better” or more effective than indirect implementation 
through federal legislation or by State law.  
Consider, for example, the complaints brought against the United 
States for its failure to comply effectively with its obligations under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.19 Article 36 of the Convention 
states that 
[T]he competent authorities of the receiving State shall, 
without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State 
if, within its consular district, a national of that State is 
arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial 
or is detained in any other manner. Any communication 
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in 
prison, custody or detention shall be forwarded by the said 
authorities without delay . . . .20 
When ratified in 1969, the treaty was deemed self-executing and thus 
became directly applicable throughout the United States. In several 
notorious instances, however, foreign nationals were arrested by local 
authorities but not advised of their rights under the Vienna Convention, 
and in consequence the United States was held in breach of its 
international obligations. 
Since 1997, six capital punishment cases involving the failure to 
comply with Article 36 were appealed to federal courts after the 
defendants had exhausted their remedies at the State level, and non-
compliance was one among several issues in twenty-one other cases.21 
Three cases resulted in the United States being brought before the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for its failure to carry out its treaty 
obligations as stated in Article 36. In 1998, Paraguay instituted 
proceedings against the United States contending that the 
                                               
19. See, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 134 F.3d 
622, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1998). 
20. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1)(b), Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77. 
21. Isaac Olson, Vienna Convention Death Appeals Cases: 1997 to Present (Sept. 15, 2018) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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Commonwealth of Virginia had detained, tried and convicted a 
Paraguayan national, Angel Francisco Breard, of murder and attempted 
rape and sentenced him to death, all without advising him of his right to 
consular assistance or notifying Paraguayan consular officials.22 Paraguay 
sought interim measures to prevent the execution of its national. 
Nevertheless, Breard was executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia on 
April 15, 1998. 
In the case of José Medellín, a Mexican national who confessed to the 
1993 gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston, Texas, local 
authorities failed to inform the Mexican consulate of his arrest or apprise 
Mr. Medellín of his rights to have consular assistance while he was in 
custody. In 2003, Mexico brought suit against the United States in the 
International Court of Justice claiming the United States to be in violation 
of its obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. In 
2004, the ICJ found the United States in violation of its treaty obligations 
vis-à-vis Mexico. The ICJ determined that the “appropriate reparation in 
this case consists in the obligation of the United States of America to 
provide, by means of its own choosing, review and reconsideration of the 
convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals.”23 In his final appeal 
to the U.S. Supreme Court, Mr. Medellín sought to enforce the ICJ 
judgment, arguing that the United States was legally bound to comply with 
it.24 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, determined that judgments of the 
International Court of Justice are not directly applicable as domestic law 
in the United States.25 Neither the Optional Protocol to the Vienna 
Convention (which permitted the Court to hear the case) nor the U.N. 
Charter Article 94 (which obligated the United States to comply with the 
ICJ’s judgment) are directly applicable (“self-executing”) as a matter of 
U.S. law. Even more importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court said that the 
President alone could not make them “self-executing.” 26 In this instance, 
although there is a clear treaty obligation, the practical effect of making 
the treaty ‘non-self-executing’ is to render it unenforceable in federal 
court. Consequently, foreigners denied the benefits of a treaty by State 
authorities would have no remedy.  
Moreover, attempts to “federalize” ordinary policing by national 
legislation have been met with reluctance by federal authorities and strong 
opposition by States. Proposed federal legislation was therefore never 
                                               
22. Allen, 134 F.3d at 622. 
23. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. 12,72 (Mar. 31). 
24. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504. 
25. Id. at 508-09. 
26. Id. at 530. 




adopted.27 Clearly, this gap in the domestic effectiveness of the 
international legal obligations of the United States could be filled by 
subnational implementation in the form of individual States passing 
legislation guaranteeing the rights accorded by the treaty. Individual States 
— California, Illinois, and Oregon — have enacted some form of State 
or local law to implement Article 36, but most have not.28 
In many cases, subnational implementation of treaties is not necessary 
because of the correspondence of existing domestic law with the relevant 
treaty obligations. For example, in the case of the 1984 U.N. Convention 
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, the Reagan administration determined that “implementing 
legislation was not necessary since existing federal and state law already 
provided grounds for prosecuting anyone accused of committing an act 
within the scope of the term ‘torture’ as defined by the Convention.”29 
Since new, sweeping federal legislation was not needed, the goals of the 
treaty were given effect largely by State law — though the federal criminal 
code was amended to permit, in some situations, prosecution of acts of 
torture committed outside the United States.30 
The contours of the distinction between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties were unclear from the outset, and they continue to 
trouble courts and scholars alike. In a recent formulation, the U.S. 
Supreme Court pronounced that “[a] non-self-executing treaty, by 
definition, is one that was ratified with the understanding that it is not to 
have domestic effect of its own force” and thus can only be enforced 
pursuant to duly-enacted legislation.31 
Under this approach, unless so implemented, such a treaty does not 
create binding or enforceable federal law. Nonetheless, a constituent State 
may not constitutionally adopt legislation (or take other action) that would 
be contrary to an accepted treaty obligation of the United States, whether 
self-executing or not. 
                                               
27. See Consular Notification Compliance Act of 2011, S. 1194, 112th Cong. (2011). 
28. See generally David P. Stewart, The Emergent Human Right to Consular Notification, Access and 
Assistance, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF NEW HUMAN RIGHTS: RECOGNITION, NOVELTY, 
RHETORIC (Andreas von Arnauld et al. eds., forthcoming 2020). 
29. Id. at 248-49. 
30. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, added by Pub. L. No. 103-236, tit. V, § 506(a), 108 Stat. 463 (1994); 
amended by Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. VI, § 60020, 108 Stat. 1979 (1994); Pub. L. No. 107-56, tit. 
VIII, § 811(g), 115 Stat. 381 (2001). 
31. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 527; see also id. at 505 n.2 (“The label ‘self-executing’ has on occasion 
been used to convey different meanings. What we mean by ‘self-executing’ is that the treaty has 
automatic domestic effect as federal law upon ratification. Conversely, a ‘non-self-executing’ treaty 
does not by itself give rise to domestically enforceable federal law. Whether such a treaty has 
domestic effect depends upon implementing legislation passed by Congress.”); Missouri v. 
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (finding some treaties require implementing legislation). 
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For many years the issue of non-self-execution was a relatively 
technical one, largely left to the courts to decide on a case-by-case basis 
as the issue was presented in the specific context of litigation.32 With the 
post-World War II proliferation of multilateral treaties, however, and in 
particular the adoption of increasingly detailed human rights treaties, 
attention focused on the effect a ratified treaty would have on the related 
questions of (i) individual rights (i.e., when and in what circumstances 
could individuals rely on treaties to challenge the laws and actions of the 
States as well as the federal government for alleged violations of human 
rights), and (ii) federalism (i.e., to what extent could a treaty authorize the 
federal government to regulate subjects or spheres of activity traditionally 
within the purview of the States — such as family law).33   
The underlying structural concerns (i.e., about questions of 
federalism, intrusion into State and local matters, and changing State and 
local law through the treaty power) have in some well-known instances 
actually prevented U.S. adherence to multilateral conventions. In 
particular, these issues have resulted in the Senate’s refusal to give advice 
and consent to a number of human rights treaties, including the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
Most tellingly, the executive branch has not even transmitted to the Senate 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the United States signed 
in 1995 but today is the only country in the world not to have ratified, 
largely (but not exclusively) because of federalism issues.34 
In part as a consequence of the resulting frustration on the part of 
human rights advocates, a number of initiatives have been undertaken in 
the United States to adopt the substance of some human rights treaties at 
the State, city and local levels.35 Even though States, cities and local 
                                               
32. See Holland, 252 U.S. 416; Medellin, 552 U.S. 491; Republic of Marshall Islands v. United 
States, 865 F.3d 118 (9th Cir. 2017). 
33. The latter question had, of course, been a source of controversy ever since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Holland, id. In the period immediately following World War II and the creation 
of the UN, it had become especially contested in respect of federal efforts to force the segregationist 
states to change their laws. The conservative reaction took the form of the so-called “Bricker 
Amendment,” which (in general terms) would have prevented use of the treaty power to change 
domestic law (inter alia by forbidding “self- executing” treaties). See generally DAVID SLOSS, THE 
DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (2016); MARTIN 
FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RULE IN 
U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2019). 
34. David P. Stewart, Ratification of Convention on the Rights of the Child, 5 GEO. J. FIGHTING 
POVERTY 161, 176 (1998). 
35. David Kaye, State Execution of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 3 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 95, 97-98 (2013); CLOSING THE GAP: THE FEDERAL ROLE IN RESPECTING & 
ENSURING HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE STATE & LOCAL LEVEL, COLUM. L. SCH. HUM. RTS. INST. 
(2013) (discussing ways states, cities, and local governments can work to give effect to the purposes 
and principles of ICCPR). 




governments cannot directly “join” or become a “party” to any 
international treaty (whether or not ratified by the United States), they are 
not prohibited from adopting measures to give effect to some of the 
substantive requirements and protections of a treaty, as long as their 
implementation does not conflict with federal law. The extent to which 
an action might be considered “pre-empted” because of conflict with 
federal foreign relations authority or policy, presumably including 
obligations of international law, is a debated and unclear issue.36 On a 
more practical level, as Judith Resnik observes, “to look only at the 
national level is to miss a lot of the action.”37 
By way of example, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, adopted the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (of course, not as a treaty or even 
a law, but as a standard for behavior) in 2009. In one fashion or another, 
Hawaii, Rhode Island and South Carolina, along with Austin, Chicago, 
New York, and Savannah are said to have endorsed the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (at least its principles).38 In 1998, San Francisco 
famously adopted the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) as a local ordinance. Other 
U.S. cities have joined “Cities for CEDAW,” which describes itself as a 
movement of city and local activists across the United States “aiming to 
incorporate the gender- equity principles and obligations of CEDAW into 
city governance and local city policies. Seven cities39 have passed 
CEDAW ordinances. Twenty other cities have passed CEDAW 
resolutions affirming support for CEDAW principles. More than 30 other 
cities including Boston, Denver, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, 
Portland, Tacoma, and Washington, D.C. are considering either a 
                                               
36. In Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 
an Oregon statute barring citizens of communist countries from inheriting property of in-state 
decedents, on the ground that – even in the absence of an applicable federal law or treaty – it 
constituted “an intrusion in the federal domain” with “a direct impact upon foreign relations [that] . 
. . may well adversely affect the power of the central government to deal with those problems.” Id. 
at 441. The decision is often described as establishing a doctrine of “dormant foreign affairs pre-
emption”; cf. Ingrid Wuerth, The Future of the Federal Common Law of Foreign Relations, 106 GEO. L.J. 
1825 (2018). But see Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 533 U.S. 396, 421 (2003) (distinguishing between 
“field” and “conflict” pre-emption and noting that “[t]he exercise of the federal executive authority 
means that State law must give way where, as here, there is evidence of clear conflict between the 
policies adopted by the two”). 
37. Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73 MO. L. 
REV. 1105, 1110 (2008). 
38. See BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC, N.W. U. SCH. OF L., TOOLKIT FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD BY CITY COUNCILS AND STATE LEGISLATURES 8 
(2009). 
39. The cities are San Francisco, California; Berkeley, California; Cincinnati, Ohio; Honolulu, 
Hawaii; Los Angeles, California; Miami-Dade County, Florida; and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 
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CEDAW ordinance or resolution.40 More recently, the Trump 
Administration’s renunciation of the Paris Climate Agreement has 
apparently reinvigorated an effort at the subnational level to adopt 
measures giving effect to international undertakings on climate change.41 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: UNDERSTANDING 
SUBNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
Subnational implementation of international agreements results from 
one of the gaps between what we refer to as the normative and operating 
systems in international law.42 What we see as a gap that impedes 
implementation of an international obligation may prove to be an 
important checkpoint to ensure adequate capacity to carry out the 
international obligation including the alignment of political interests. 
Described in more detail below, the normative system is directive in that 
it specifies the prescriptions and prohibitions for behavior among actors 
in the international system. The operating system is structural in that it 
provides the institutions and processes to regulate how law is created, 
implemented, and enforced. 
 
A. The Normative System 
 
“Normative” is used to describe the directive aspects of international 
law because this area of law creates norms out of particular values or 
policies. These norms are quasi-legislative in character because they direct 
specific changes in state and other actors’ behaviors, such as limitations 
on child labor.43 In defining the normative system, the participants in the 
                                               
40. See generally CITIES FOR CEDAW: A CAMPAIGN TO MAKE THE GLOBAL LOCAL (June 
Zeitlin et al. eds., 2017); David P. Stewart, Incorporating International Human Rights Law: Well Known 
Limitations and New Initiatives Taken at State, City and Local Levels, 38 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1(2018). 
41. U.S. State Climate Action Plans, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Apr. 2019), 
https://www.c2es.org/document/climate-action-plans (suggesting many States have, or are 
developing, climate action plans); see also Audrey Comstock, U.S. Cities and States Want to Implement 
the Paris Climate Accord Goals. It’s Not That Simple, WASH. POST, (June 13, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/13/u-s-cities-and-states-
want-to-implement-the-paris-climate-accord-goals-its-not-that-simple/ (identifying the challenges 
States face in attempting to implement the Paris Climate Agreement on a subnational level); S.F., 
CAL. ENVTL. CODE ch. 1, § 100(E) (2008) (adopting the Precautionary Principle). 
42. DIEHL & KU, supra note 18, at 2. 
43. Our conception of a normative system is similar to what Hart defines as primary rules that 
impose duties on actors to perform or abstain from actions, but there is an important difference. See 
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 151 (1961). Hart sees primary rules as the basic building 
blocks of a legal system, logically and naturally coming before the development of what we define as 
the operating system components. Id. at 91–92. For Hart, a primitive legal system can be one with 
developed rules, but without substantial structures to interpret or enforce those rules. Id. at 89. Our 
view of the normative system does not necessarily assign primacy to such rules vis-à-vis the operating 




international legal process engage in a political and legislative exercise that 
defines the substance and scope of the law. Nevertheless, the 
establishment of international legal norms still is less precise and 
structured than in domestic legal systems where formal deliberative 
bodies enact legislation. 
In contrast to the general terms associated with topics of the 
operating system (see below, e.g., jurisdiction, actors or dispute 
resolution), the normative system is issue-specific, with many 
components within issue areas (e.g., status of women within the broader 
topic area of human rights). Many normative issues have long been on the 
agenda of international law, such as proscriptions on the use of military 
force or various rules concerning the law of the sea (e.g., seizure of 
commercial vessels during wartime). Others such as human rights and the 
environment have developed almost exclusively in the past seventy years. 
 
B. The Operating System 
 
The effectiveness of the normative system depends in large part on 
the operating system, the mechanisms and processes that are designed to 
ensure orderly processes and compliance with those norms, and change 
if problems signal a need for change.44 The operating system of 
international law sets out the consensus of its constituent actors (primarily 
states) on distribution of authority and responsibilities for governance 
within the system. Who, for example, are the authorized decision-makers 
in international law? Whose actions can bind not only the parties involved, 
but also others? How do we know that an authoritative decision has taken 
place? When does the resolution of a conflict or a dispute give rise to new 
law? These are the questions that the operating system answers. Note that 
the operating system may be associated with formal structures, but not all 
operating system elements are institutional. For example, the Vienna 
Convention on Treaties45 establishes no institutional mechanisms but 
does specify various operational rules about treaties and therefore the 
parameters of law making. 
 
C. Gaps in the Operating System 
 
The development of a new legal norm (or the extensive modification 
of an existing one) may produce changes in the international operating 
                                               
system. The normative system may be somewhat autonomous from the operating system and may 
even lag behind in its development. 
44. DIEHL & KU, supra note 18, at 28-30; HART, supra note 43, at 209. 
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
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system. Yet the latter is far from guaranteed. First, the extant operating 
system may be able to accommodate the new norm with no changes 
required. For example, a new global trade agreement may comport well 
with existing World Trade Organization mechanisms, including its forum 
for dispute resolution. In this way, new norms do not upset the 
equilibrium between normative and operating systems. 
In a second scenario, a new norm may arise that necessitates a change 
in the operating system in order to give the former full effect, but such a 
change does not occur because the operating system is incompatible, 
ineffective, or insufficient to give the new norm effect. For example, 
holding national leaders responsible for torture or other crimes 
(Convention on Torture) created new norms, but is incompatible with 
notions of sovereign immunity. The 1999 Spanish case against Chile’s 
General Pinochet demonstrates this tension.46 
Operating system change, although needed, may not occur, and as a 
result an imbalance is created between the operating and normative 
systems. Thus, certain norms will not have effect in the system; that is, 
they will not be implemented, observed, or enforced in an efficient 
manner. What is likely to happen as a result of this imbalance? The most 
obvious answer is nothing: the system remains out of equilibrium and new 
international legal norms have limited or no effect on behavior. Yet other 
possibilities exist. There are other processes by which the operating-
normative system imbalance can be redressed — all outside the formal 
international legal system. Subnational implementation is one of those 
processes. Let us briefly note some of the other possibilities.47 
First, non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) can play a role as 
supplements to or substitutes for the international law operating system. 
The technical character of many issues now facing policymakers 
continues to make them, as they have been for decades, receptive to 
expert information. Thus, some NGOs are well positioned to assume 
roles in the implementation of norms, particularly in those areas in which 
specialized expertise is required. 
Second, “soft law” mechanisms might be used for ensuring norm 
compliance.48 Despite some ambiguity, soft law mechanisms are broadly 
those that do not involve a formal legal obligation or legal processes, but 
nevertheless represent a shared understanding or consensus about 
procedure or behavior among the parties. In the context of the operating 
system, informal or soft mechanisms for resolving jurisdictional 
                                               
46. R. v. Bow St. Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3) 
[1999] UKHL 17 [2000] 1 AC (HL) 147 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
47. See DIEHL & KU, supra note 22, at 108-25. 
48. Gregory C. Schaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, & 
Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 712–15, 719–21 (2010). 




disagreements (e.g., how to resolve disputes when overlapping 
jurisdiction is present) or disputes over substance (e.g., what diplomatic 
solutions are legitimized) represent soft law adaptations to inadequacies 
in “hard law” provisions. A growing body of empirical work shows that 
such informal mechanisms influence behavior.49 
A third gap filling process is legal internalization. This occurs when 
an international norm is embedded in the national legal systems and 
domestic legal mechanisms pick up the slack left by inadequacies in 
international legal mechanisms. One form is legislative internalization, 
when domestic lobbying embeds international law norms into binding 
national legislation or even constitutional law that officials of a 
government must then obey as part of the domestic legal fabric. Local 
actors then attain standing to press claims and seek redress in domestic 
courts. The European Union represents a special case and one in which 
internalization has gradually become more routinized.50 When national 
adoption of legislation does not occur or is not appropriate in a federal 
system, adoption might occur by governmental units at the subnational 
level.  
Subnational implementation represents a special kind of approach to 
filling the gap left when the national legal operating system cannot give 
full effect to treaty obligations. In federal systems with independent 
component government entities (e.g., the United States or Canada) 
encompassing multiple layers of government, it might be impossible for 
international law to have immediate legal impact within a subnational unit 
without additional national or subnational action, that is without 
implementing legislation. In the U.S. system, this could be national 
legislation that results in federalizing areas that may otherwise be within 
State and local jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the power to federalize is 
limited. As noted in Bond v. United States: 
 
                                               
49. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman & Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 171, 202 (2010) (“There is a broad consensus in the international law literature that the 
nonbinding rulings of international tribunals do, indeed, influence legal rules.”); Gregory Schaffer 
& Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 39 (2012) 
(discussing the role of nonstate actors and “soft law” in the production of international 
environmental law); Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (and How it Doesn’t), 99 
GEO. L.J. 257, 263 (2011) (“[E]ven where rules are not legally binding, they may still influence the 
behavior of regulators and market participants seeking to make credible commitments of efficiency, 
value, and strong corporate governance to investors.”); Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: 
Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008) (discussing how soft law influences 
the behavior of other lawmaking bodies and of the public); Thomas A. Mensah, Soft Law: A Fresh 
Look at an Old Mechanism, 38 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 50, 51 (2008) (discussing how particular soft law 
principles and rules may be used to regulate or influence the operation of states and other actors in 
ways that contribute to the protection of the environment and sustainable development). 
50. Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 42 (1993). 
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It has long been settled, for example, that we presume 
federal statutes do not abrogate state sovereign immunity . 
. . . Closely related to these is the well- established principle 
that “it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain 
of Congress’ intent before finding that federal law 
overrides” the “usual constitutional balance of federal and 
state powers.”51 
 
As the level of government charged with carrying out the foreign 
relations of the United States, however, the federal government can in 
many cases preempt State and local law where inconsistent with U.S. 
international obligations.52  
Indeed, some international legal obligations by their very character 
require changes in internal or national law. In federal systems, national 
legislation to implement treaty obligations might prove difficult given 
constitutional provisions and other devolution to lower level government 
entities. Soft law and the employment of NGOs are also not options in 
these situations to deal with the normative-operating gap. In these 
instances, the adoption of laws at the State or provincial level might be 
the way to ensure that treaty obligations at the national level are met and 
international norms influence behaviors in the manner intended 
domestically. We examine that process and its effectiveness in the United 
States in the following sections. 
IV. THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION AND SUBNATIONAL 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
                                               
51. Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 856–57 (2014). 
52. For a contemporary example of a preemption conflict, see United States v. California, 921 
F.3d. 865, 881-82 (9th Cir. 2019), an action initiated by the United States in response to the sanctuary 
movement claiming that three California laws were preempted due to conflicts with federal law. One 
limited the discretion of state and local officials to cooperate with federal immigration authorities 
(S.B. 54). Another required the state attorney general to inspect facilities where immigrants were being 
detained by federal agents while awaiting court dates or deportation (A.B. 103). A third prohibited 
public and private employers from cooperating with federal enforcement (unless such cooperation is 
mandated by a court order or a specific federal law), and required employers to notify employees of 
federal scrutiny (A.B. 450). The district court denied in most regards the United States’ motion for a 
preliminary injunction. The court of appeals held that the district court had not abused its discretion 
in concluding that A.B. 450, including its employee-notice provisions, was not preempted; that S.B. 
54’s limitations on cooperation were consistent with the Tenth Amendment and the anti-
commandeering doctrine; but that one component of A.B. 103 discriminated against and burdened 
the federal government in violation of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine. As had the district 
court, the court of appeals distinguished Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), insofar as the 
State law regulated State law enforcement activities, and employer-employee relationships, rather than 
varying the techniques for regulating employers that Congress had already extensively (and 
exclusively) regulated. Id. 




Although subnational implementation might be required to give 
treaties their intended effect, there is no guarantee it will occur. There are 
a number of entities that provide the U.S. Department of State with useful 
advice on the issue of subnational treaty implementation.53 We focus on 
one of these — the Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”)54 — and examine 
whether engaging the ULC and translating treaty obligations into uniform 
State legislation would improve the likelihood of States complying with 
international treaty obligations in the United States. Even if the 
mechanism of uniform State legislation is not required for a treaty to have 
its intended effect, the ULC plays a role in shaping implementation at the 
national level so the treaty is more congruent with existing State law. 
Since its creation in 1892 the ULC has been a central player in the 
codification of State law in the United States.55 According to an FAQ 
posted on its official website, “the ULC is the nation’s oldest State 
governmental association. A nonpartisan, volunteer organization, the 
ULC is the source of more than 300 draft and proposed statutes that 
secure uniformity of state law when differing laws would undermine the 
interests of citizens throughout the United States.”56 There are 
commissioners from every State, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and the U.S. Virgin Islands. A commissioner must be an attorney 
appointed by a governmental authority, most commonly the governor, 
and must serve as a volunteer who receives no salary or other form of 
compensation.57 The primary areas in which the organization has 
produced uniform acts are commercial law, family and domestic relations 
law, probate and trust law, real estate law, and the law governing alternate 
forms of dispute resolution, but there are uniform acts on a wide range of 
other topics. 
Approval for the drafting of a uniform act must be based on a 
determination that uniformity among the States is desirable and 
practicable, and the purpose of a uniform act is to simplify “individuals’ 
lives and facilitate business transactions by providing consistent rules and 
procedures from State to State. Every day, when a person conducts 
business, enters a contract, makes a purchase or sale, obtains or transfers 
                                               
53. See, e.g., Office of the Legal Adviser, General Resources – Private International Law, U.S. STATE 
DEP’T, https://www.state.gov/general-resources-private-international-law/(last visited Jan. 1, 
2020) (listing as resources the American Branch of the International Law Association, the American 
Law Institute, the Section on International Law of the American Bar Association, the American 
Society of International Law and the Uniform Law Commission). 
54. The formal name of the Uniform Law Commission is the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. See UNIF. LAW. COMM’N CONST. art. 1, § 1.1, 2009–2010 
REF. BOOK 113 (2009). 
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property, or takes care of a family matter, it is likely that a ULC law 
applies.”58 
The ULC does not have lawmaking authority; rather, it drafts acts for 
the various jurisdictions to consider and enact. Because each jurisdiction’s 
legislature has the ultimate enacting authority, even a uniform act may 
contain non-uniform provisions that reflect local interests. Although the 
ideal, sometimes achieved, is to make the laws among the jurisdictions 
uniform, as a practical matter the effect is most commonly to harmonize 
those laws. 
ULC commissioners draft “specific acts; they discuss, consider, and 
amend drafts of other commissioners; they decide whether to recommend 
an act as a uniform or a model act; and they work toward enactment of 
ULC acts in their home jurisdictions.”59 These activities apply to broad 
sets of concerns, primarily domestic ones. The question for this paper is 
what role the ULC might play in the implementation of international law, 
particularly in subjects that have been principally domestic in character 
and within the domain of the States in the U.S. federal system. The issue 
is most pertinent in subjects in which the organization has drafted and 
gained implementation of a uniform act. Given the ULC’s track record in 
harmonizing the laws of the more than fifty jurisdictions that comprise 
the U.S. federal system and given that implementation of a treaty at the 
federal level has a preemptive effect under the Supremacy Clause of the 
Constitution,60 it was inevitable that the ULC would play a role in 
implementing international treaty obligations. 
The ULC has long recognized the preemptive power of international 
law implemented at the federal level. In his address at the 1956 annual 
meeting ULC President Barton H. Kuhns stated: 
 
The problem of preserving through uniformity our state 
and local governments on the one hand, while seeking 
uniformity at an international level on the other, presents a 
sort of obstacle course into which one may tread only with 
extreme caution. The somewhat obvious method of 
unifying international law by treaty or convention might, at 
the same time, destroy the very sovereignty of the states 
which uniformity of state law is designed to protect. And 
yet, as the far corners of the world are gathered closer and 
closer together we will soon be reaching a point where the 
                                               
58. Id. 
59. Overview, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/aboutulc/overview (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2019). 
60. William H. Henning, The Uniform Law Commission and Cooperative Federalism: Implementing 
Private International Law Conventions through Uniform State Laws, 2 ELON L. REV. 39, 44 (2011). 




desirability of uniformity of the laws of different nations 
will become more and more apparent.61 
 
One way to ameliorate the preemptive effect of federal law is to 
implement a treaty in part by drafting and enacting, in coordination with 
federal authorities, uniform State legislation. An early effort to do this 
occurred in the 1970s when the United States signed the Convention 
Providing the Uniform Act on the Form of a Will completed under the 
auspices of UNIDROIT.62 The Uniform Wills Recognition Act was 
developed by the ULC in coordination with the Department of State’s 
Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law 
(“L/PIL”) and was enacted in sixteen States, but the enactment process 
stalled for a complex set of reasons and the treaty has never been ratified 
Attempts to revive the project in the early 2000s were unsuccessful.63 
More recently, ULC Commissioner and Delaware Judge Battle 
Robinson noted: “While the ULC’s primary emphasis has been on 
unifying state law, in recent years, with the rapid increase of 
‘globalization,’ the ULC has become more cognizant about the impact of 
international proposals on traditional areas of state law.”64 
Commissioner Robinson described an important component of the 
ULC’s efforts to keep abreast of international developments that might 
implicate State law as follows: 
 
In 2003, in response to [increased globalization], the ULC 
created the Committee on International Legal 
Developments. The functions of this committee include 
monitoring activities of organizations in the international 
law field that may impact state law, making 
recommendations about establishing drafting committees 
to work on projects that involve international issues, and 
following the progress of ULC projects that are 
international in scope.65 
 
                                               
61. NAT’L CONF. COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 42, 50 (1956). 
62. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) is an 
independent intergovernmental organization whose mission is to harmonize and to coordinate 
private and commercial law between states and among groups of states. For information about 
UNIDROIT, see History & Overview, UNIDROIT, https://www.unidroit.org/about-
unidroit/overview (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
63. The enacting States delayed effectiveness until the treaty was ratified and thus the act has 
never gone into effect anywhere. 
64. B.R. Robinson, Integrating an International Convention into State Law: The UIFSA Experience, 43 
FAM. L.Q. 61, 64 (2009). 
65. Id. 
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At about the same time the ULC adopted a formal policy regarding 
its approach to international matters. The 2006 Statement of Policy on 
International Activities explains: 
 
With the movement toward globalization, the federal 
government increasingly participates in the promulgation of 
private international law conventions that, upon 
ratification, become preemptive federal law. This disrupts 
the law in areas such as commercial and family law that 
historically have been regulated at the state level and that 
have been the subject of numerous uniform and model laws 
promulgated by the Conference. The states have a 
profound interest in, to the extent practicable, having 
international conventions mesh with their existing laws, 
influencing the law’s development in other countries so that 
it is compatible with American legal concepts, and 
harmonizing their own laws with the laws of other 
countries. This will facilitate transactions and movement 
across borders and will provide the citizens of the states a 
familiar and appropriate legal framework as they participate 
in the global community. For the same reasons it benefits 
our citizens and businesses to have uniform state laws, so 
too will they benefit by having their state laws work in 
harmony with the laws of other nations.66 
 
The ULC’s interest in international laws and agreements grows out of 
its mission to ensure that such laws and agreements are not “unduly 
disruptive of state interests.”67 As former ULC Executive Director 
William Henning has written: 
 
[I]t is not surprising that the ULC and the State 
Department’s Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for 
Private International Law, known within State as L/PIL, 
have developed a close working relationship. Each has a 
distinct sphere of interest and there is a tension between 
those spheres, yet there is sufficient overlap that a 
significant level of cooperation is in the interests of both.68 
                                               
66. Policy Position on International Activities, UNIF. ACTIVITIES ENEWSLETTER (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N), MAY 2006, Uniform Law Commission, Executive Committee Handbook, Item eIII.I.4. The 
handbook. which contains all ULC policies, is continuously updated and a copy of the version in 
effect as of January 1, 2020 is on file with William Henning. See Henning, supra note 60, at 41. 
67. Henning, supra note 60, at 43. 
68. Id. at 43-44. 





This cooperation can be further seen in the presence of senior 
members of L/PIL serving as advisory members of the ULC. L/PIL has 
also regularly reached out to the ULC, among other stakeholders and 
interested parties, for help in formulating negotiating positions, to staff 
delegations, and in identifying relevant expertise.69 
Although the U.S. Constitution prohibits States from becoming 
parties to international conventions, there is nothing in the Constitution 
that prevents States from cooperating with the federal government, even 
though they are not required to, by implementing them at the State level 
through appropriate State legislation unless the Constitution vests the 
matter with the federal government.70 Indeed, we will see below the 
advantages of developing an implementation plan during international 
negotiations for obligations that affect State laws. When there are ULC 
products and drafting experience available to facilitate the implementation 
process at the State level, this should enhance the ability of the United 
States. to ratify such agreements.71 
For example, a treaty could be negotiated by federal authorities with 
ULC experts serving on the negotiating delegations or otherwise assisting 
in the negotiating process, followed by States enacting uniform laws 
promulgated by the ULC in cooperation with federal authorities. After 
the ground had been prepared in this manner the treaty would be formally 
adopted with Senate advice and consent and executive ratification. This 
occurred with regard to the Hague Convention on the International 
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance 
(Child Support Convention), aspects of which are discussed in the ensuing 
sections.72 The ULC worked closely with L/PIL and the Office of Child 
Support Enforcement (“OCSE”) in the Department of Health and 
Human Services to develop the convention; ULC-related experts served 
on the negotiating delegation; and the Uniform Interstate Family Support 
Act (“UIFSA”), already in effect in every ULC jurisdiction, was amended 
to include the substantive provisions of the convention, thereby 
empowering the State agencies that collect child support domestically to 
do so internationally. The Senate gave its advice and consent and federal 
legislation was adopted conditioning federal funding for child support 
                                               
69. See Curtis R. Reitz, Globalization, International Legal Developments, and Uniform State Laws, 51 
LOY. L. REV. 301, 308 (2005). 
70. Henning, supra note 60, at 44-45. 
71. Reitz, supra note 69, at 327. 
72. Mary Helen Carlson, United States Perspective on the New Hague Convention on the International 
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, 43 FAM. L.Q. 21, 26–31 (2009) 
(containing an excellent discussion of the project). 
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collection in a State on enactment of amended UIFSA in that State.73 
Amended UIFSA was enacted in every ULC jurisdiction and the 
instrument of ratification was deposited with the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, thereby making the United States a party to the 
convention effective January 1, 2017.74 
The child-support project was a spectacular success, but in many 
instances not all of the events necessary for success will occur and those 
that do can occur in various sequences. The ULC might be involved in 
some or all of the stages as we note below. 
 
A. The ULC Development and Enactment Process 
 
An understanding of the ULC’s role in international matters requires 
an understanding of the organization’s ordinary processes applicable to 
the development of domestic State law. The ULC places no restrictions 
on where proposals for new projects originate. Proposers are generally 
from State bar associations, State governments, private groups, ULC 
commissioners, joint and permanent editorial boards,75 and individuals. 
Proposals are reviewed by the Committee on Scope and Program, which 
makes a recommendation to the Executive Committee as to action. The 
possible outcomes of the Scope Committee’s review are: 
 
• Dismiss the proposal as not viable; 
• Request that the proposer develop the idea further; 
                                               
73. 42 U.S.C.A. § 666(f) (“In order to satisfy section 654(20)(A) of this title, each State must 
have in effect the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, as approved by the American Bar 
Association on February 9, 1993, including any amendments officially adopted as of September 30, 
2008 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.”). 
74. For a list of parties to the Convention of 23 November 2007 on the International Recovery 
of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, see Status Table, HAGUE CONFERENCE 
ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-
table/?cid=131 (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). 
75. Editorial boards are partnerships with other organizations (most commonly a section of the 
American Bar Association but often another professional organization), have their own budgets, are 
typically staffed by a scholar with expertise in the area, and often have advisors or liaison members 
from organizations that are not formally part of the partnership. The editorial boards are: The 
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code (with the American Law Institute); 
Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts (with the American Bar Association’s Real 
Property, Trust, and Estate Section, American College of Real Estate Lawyers, American College of 
Mortgage Attorneys); Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Family Laws (with American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers, Association of Family and Conciliation Courts); Joint Editorial Board for 
International Law (with ABA International Law Section); Joint Editorial Board for Uniform 
Unincorporated Entity Acts (with the American Bar Association’s Business Law Section); and the 
Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trust and Estate Acts (with the American Bar Association’s Real 
Property, Trust, and Estate Section, American College of Trust and Estate Counsel). 




• If the proposal did not originate with a joint or permanent 
editorial board, forward it to the appropriate editorial board for 
further analysis and recommendation; 
• Recommend the formation of a study committee; and 
• Recommend the formation of a drafting committee 
 
The normal process was followed with regard to the child- support 
project discussed above. The project began when Mary Helen Carlson, 
the L/PIL attorney-adviser who headed the U.S. delegation that 
negotiated the Child Support Convention, appeared before the Scope and 
Program Committee at the ULC’s July 2006 annual meeting to explore 
the formation of a drafting committee to integrate the convention into 
UIFSA.76 Scope and Program recommended the project to the Executive 
Committee, which concluded that it should be undertaken. A drafting 
committee was formed in March 2007 that was chaired by Commissioner 
Robinson77 and included individuals who were participating in or serving 
as observers at the international negotiations in the Hague.78 
Understanding the role the ULC plays in international matters 
requires an understanding of the painstaking process by which any 
uniform act is prepared.79 A project typically begins with a study 
committee, consisting of a chair, ULC members, often a reporter drawn 
from academia, and an advisory member from the ABA (all ULC study 
and drafting committees have ABA advisory members). The study must 
be open to non-ULC participants and the organization goes to great 
lengths to identify entities and individuals with an interest in the subject 
area. Depending on the topic, certain of these “stakeholders” will be 
obvious and will have been contacted by the ULC staff before the first 
meeting of the committee. Indeed, one of the first steps in many study 
projects is a “stakeholders meeting” at which those stakeholders that have 
been identified are asked to give their views on whether a proposed 
project makes sense, whether the ULC would be the right organization to 
draft an act, and whether the stakeholders are willing to participate in the 
drafting process. Among the study committee’s ongoing tasks is the 
identification and outreach to other stakeholders, including academic 
experts who might be willing to participate. The formal ULC term for all 
                                               
76. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 65. 
77. The reporter for the project was Professor John J. Sampson of the University of Texas 
School of Law, a noted international expert in the field of family law. 
78. Further coordination with the treaty drafting project was seen in the presence of William 
Duncan, Deputy Secretary-General of the Hague Conference, who attended the initial session of the 
UIFSA drafting committee. See Robinson, supra note 64, at 67. 
79. Much of the description of the proceedings was provided by one of the co-authors, who is 
a Life Member of the ULC (meaning he has served as a commissioner for at least 20 years and been 
elected to life-member status) and served as its Executive Director from 2001 to 2007. 
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stakeholders is “observers” but the label is a misnomer — stakeholders 
are participants and are encouraged to speak at all committee meetings. 
No study or drafting committee is permitted to meet without its 
stakeholders being present. Most study committee meetings are held by 
phone or, increasingly, by computer platform. 
If the study committee recommends a drafting project, it must be 
approved by the Committee on Scope and Program and by the Executive 
Committee. The composition of the drafting committee will be similar to 
the composition of the study committee (ULC chair, reporter - there is 
always a reporter on drafting projects), ULC members, ABA advisory 
members, and observers). Drafting committees typically meet in person 
twice a year — once in the fall and once in the spring — on a Friday and 
Saturday. The most common arrangement is for several drafting 
committees to meet in the same location, and the leadership of the ULC 
participates in the meetings (they rotate from meeting to meeting but all 
will be in attendance when critical issues are discussed).80 Each draft is 
submitted to the Committee on Style, which tightly edits it according to 
the ULC’s style standards. It is important for each of the ULC’s acts to 
speak in the same voice and the recommendations of the Committee on 
Style are mandatory unless the drafting committee presents a compelling 
substantive reason not to implement them. 
The ULC holds an annual meeting each summer (usually in July) and 
at the meeting each drafting committee sits on a dais and reads its act to 
the assembled group of commissioners who have access to microphones 
in order to interact with the committee. Many issues are hotly debated. If 
the drafting committee will not accept a suggestion for changing the draft 
from the floor, the commissioner making the recommendation may make 
a motion and, if it is approved, the committee must comply. The floor has 
the ultimate say on all acts. 
Each act must be read at two or more annual meetings before it can 
be approved as a final act of the ULC (on rare occasions, the two-reading 
rule has been waived). When a new uniform act is approved by a formal 
vote of the States, it is typically forwarded to the ABA with a request for 
a resolution of support from the House of Delegates, which is usually 
forthcoming. ABA approval is desirable but not required for the act to be 
presented to States for enactment. Each uniform act is accompanied by a 
set of official comments, which are produced by the chair and reporter. 
Although the comments are widely circulated for input before being 
                                               
80. The leadership consists of the President, the Chair of the Executive Committee (the 
presumptive next president), and the Executive Director. The President is a volunteer commissioner 
elected by a majority vote of the commissioners and serves a two-year term. The Chair of the 
Executive Committee is also a volunteer commissioner and is appointed by the President. The 
Executive Director is a professional employee of the ULC. 




finalized, they are not approved by the floor. If an act is approved at an 
annual meeting in July, the comments are typically complete by October 
so that the act can be available to states in the legislative session beginning 
the next January. 
The enactment process is overseen by the Legislative Committee, 
which consists of a chair and a group of commissioners with experience 
in the legislative process. Members of the committee often have 
experience as legislators or lobbyists. There is a liaison member from each 
State’s delegation of commissioners. The Legislative Committee is 
supported by a staff consisting of a chief counsel, a 
program/communications director, and several attorneys. The Legislative 
Committee develops a plan for the enactment of each uniform act. 
Gaining enactment is difficult even though commissioners from each 
State are obligated “to procure consideration by the legislature of the 
State, unless the commissioners consider the act inappropriate for 
enactment in their state.”81 A legislator in each State must be identified 
who will sponsor the act — ideally there will be a sponsor in each house 
of the legislature. It is surprisingly difficult to find sponsors for 
“good government” types of acts. A legislator may only have an 
opportunity to introduce one or two bills during a session and will want 
to be sure they are on topics that will be perceived as important by 
constituents. Because the ULC has a delegation from each State that has 
been appointed by the political authorities within the State, good 
connections to legislators exist and this facilitates the introduction of acts. 
ULC permanent staff assigned to the enactment process get to know 
some legislators in various States who can be counted on to be supportive 
of ULC acts.  
Despite the sustained and regular engagement with stakeholders, 
opposition can still emerge. If the opposition is organized it can prevent 
enactment. The solution is sometimes to negotiate with the opposition 
and modify the act to meet the concerns but only in a manner that is 
consistent with sound public policy. This slows the process down as any 
substantive modifications have to be approved by all commissioners 
(there are streamlined procedures for obtaining approval in limited 
circumstances, but they still take time). Often, an act will first be referred 
to a state bar association, which will form a committee to review it and 
make recommendations to the legislature. This can be extremely helpful 
but is also time consuming. 
                                               
81. UNIF. LAW COMM’N, EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HANDBOOK, ITEM III.C, POLICY 
ESTABLISHING CRITERIA AND PROCEDURES FOR DESIGNATION AND CONSIDERATION OF ACTS 
¶ 5 (2018), reprinted in UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 2018-2019 REFERENCE BOOK 185 (2018). The 
Reference Book is not distributed to libraries or posted online but is an invaluable resource, with 
copies sent to all commissioners and to anyone else upon request. 
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The most successful enactment strategy involves a coordinated 
campaign by the ULC and the stakeholders that have participated in the 
drafting of the act and have become convinced of the importance of 
enactment. The ULC obtains support letters from stakeholders and, 
whenever possible, the stakeholders are asked to assist with a lobbying 
effort. There are times when a uniform act is highly successful — 
occasionally gaining enactment in all States, sometimes in forty or more 
States. The ULC considers an act to have been successful if it is enacted 
in fifteen to twenty States. Some of the acts gain only a handful of 
enactments and some are not enacted anywhere. 
 
A. ULC Participation in Treaty Negotiation and Domestic Implementation 
 
The above discussion should not be understood to suggest that the 
ULC only becomes involved when treaty negotiations are underway or to 
suggest that implementation must occur through uniform legislation. The 
ULC has a robust relationship with L/PIL and often becomes involved 
at a much earlier stage and in a variety of ways. An understanding of these 
points requires an understanding of the ULC’s internal structure as 
applied to international issues.82 
An important element of the ULC’s international efforts is the Joint 
Editorial Board for International Law (“JEB/IL”), a partnership between 
the ULC and the ABA Section on International Law that was created in 
2007 and charged with (1) recommending as appropriate the adoption of 
uniform State laws on international and transnational subjects; (2) 
advising and assisting the federal government in international 
negotiations; (3) promoting education about the rule of law and the 
harmonization of law at the international level; and (4) furthering the goals 
of the ULC and the ABA section.83  
Representatives of L/PIL regularly attend meetings of the JEB/IL to 
brief the members on existing and prospective projects and to assist in 
fulfilling the board’s responsibilities. Recently, Peter Lown, former 
President of the Uniform Law Conference of Canada,84 joined the 
                                               
82. For an excellent and thorough discussion of the history of the ULC’s international activities, 
see ROBERT A. STEIN, FORMING A MORE PERFECT UNION: A HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW 
COMMISSION, ch. 10 (2013). 
83. Memorandum of Understanding from the Joint Editorial Board for International Law (Jan. 
3, 2007). 
84. The ULC has a longstanding and very close relationship with the Uniform Law Conference 
of Canada (ULCC). The President of the ULCC regularly attends and makes a presentation at the 
annual meeting of the ULC and the ULC President does likewise with regard to the ULCC’s annual 
meeting. The ULC also has a close relationship with the Mexican Center for Uniform Law. The ULC 
and the ULCC have undertaken multiple joint drafting projects in an attempt to harmonize the laws 
of the two countries and the Mexican Center has often participated. A standing charge to the ULC’s 




JEB/IL as Director of Research, greatly strengthening its capacity to 
make informed recommendations. The ULC’s International Legal 
Developments Committee is charged with serving as liaison to the ULC’s 
Canadian and Mexican counterparts and to the State Department. The 
committee reviews proposed international projects, often relying on 
reports from the JEB/IL, and makes recommendations to the Executive 
Committee. 
The ULC often becomes involved when an international project 
undertaken by the State Department is in the negotiation stage and 
sometimes earlier. For example, L/PIL consulted with the ULC on the 
advisability of undertaking the project that ultimately led to the 2019 U.N. 
Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from 
Mediation85 (Singapore Mediation Convention), which deals with the 
recognition and enforcement of international mediated settlement 
agreements. The ULC president appointed a working group to study the 
matter and to advise L/PIL on the advisability of the project. The working 
group continued to advise L/PIL after the project commenced at the 
U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”), and 
former ULC President Harriet Lansing, who chaired the working group, 
served as a government expert on the U.S. delegation that negotiated the 
convention. 
By becoming involved in international negotiations on a subject for 
which the ULC had developed a uniform act, commissioners and former 
reporters involved with the drafting of that act or who are otherwise 
experts in the field can contribute their knowledge and experience dealing 
with legislative and policy issues required to harmonize laws in the State 
jurisdictions on that particular subject. For example, Commissioner 
Lansing was able to bring expertise gained through the process of 
developing the ULC’s Uniform Mediation Act86 to the negotiations that 
led to the promulgation of the Singapore Mediation Convention. 
As with Commissioner Lansing, representatives with ULC experience 
are often included as government experts on U.S. delegations to 
negotiations of particular conventions that would affect State laws, such 
as the U.N. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables, which is 
                                               
Scope and Program and Executive Committees when considering international projects is to ask 
whether the project might be appropriate for collaboration with its Canadian and Mexican 
counterparts. 
85. See U.N. Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation, 
G.A. Res. 73/199 (Dec. 20, 2018). 
86. The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) was approved in 2001 and the next year UNCITRAL 
promulgated the Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation. Responding to this 
development, the ULC amended UMA Section 11 in 2003 to encourage parties from different 
countries to mediate commercial disputes in accordance with the UN Model Law. See NAT’L CONF. 
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM ST. LAWS, UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 11, prefatory note (2003). 
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discussed further below. As noted above, this occurred in the drafting of 
the Child Support Convention, where both Commissioner Robinson and 
Professor Sampson, the chair and reporter of the drafting committee that 
amended UIFSA, served on the negotiating delegation. 
Another example of this synergy may be found in the drafting of 
UNIDROIT’s Convention on International Interests in Mobile 
Equipment (Capetown Convention), especially its Protocol on Matters 
Specific to Aircraft Equipment,87 which drew on the ULC’s experience 
revising Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on secured 
transactions. Professor Charles Mooney of the University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, who was co-reporter for the revision of Article 9 and 
Commissioner Edwin E. Smith, who was a member of the drafting 
committee for the revision, served on the U.S. delegation that negotiated 
the convention.88 
The Child Support Convention, discussed above, is the most 
successful example of the partnership between the ULC and the State 
Department and the only example to date of an international private law 
convention being ratified by the United States but implemented in large 
measure by a uniform law enacted in every State. Much of its success is 
owed to the exceptional process developed jointly by the ULC and its 
federal partners, L/PIL and OCSE. All delegation members met 
throughout the negotiating period to coordinate the U.S. position. The 
U.S. delegation also held meetings throughout the negotiating period 
“with relevant private sector stakeholders and government entities to 
obtain the requisite expertise and guidance on both the general direction 
the United States should take in this negotiation and the specific positions 
the U.S. delegation should pursue.”89  
The Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Private International 
Law organized a Study Group on International Child Support that held 
regular meetings open to the public and announced through the Federal 
Register. Members of the U.S. delegation made presentations at training 
sessions for State and local child support officials and at meetings of the 
ULC, National Child Support Enforcement Association, and the ABA. 
As Carlson noted: 
 
                                               
87. The Aircraft Protocol to the Convention, commonly known as the Capetown Convention, 
has been ratified by the United States as a self-executing treaty. See Protocol to the Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment – Status, UNIDROIT 
https://www.unidroit.org/status-2001capetown-aircraft (last visited Jan. 1, 2020). The other 
protocols to the convention (rail and space) have not been, and are unlikely to be, ratified. A fourth 
protocol on mining, agricultural, and construction equipment is currently being negotiated and 
Professor Mooney is participating as a U.S. delegate. 
88. Reitz, supra note 69, at 311. 
89. Carlson, supra note 72, at 25. 




The goal of this inclusive process was to include every 
interest group in the process of developing the U.S. position 
on the legal and policy issues that arose in this negotiation. 
It was of paramount importance to the U.S. delegation that 
no one was left out and that every interested party had an 
opportunity to be heard. The U.S. delegation wanted to 
produce a Convention that met the needs of America’s 
families, children, and the child support community, and 
one that that community would broadly and strongly 
support during the ratification process.90 
 
In a similar manner, former ULC Executive Director William 
Henning and Professor Neil Cohen of Brooklyn Law School91 are 
longtime members of the U.S. delegation to Working Group VI of 
UNCITRAL that produced the U.N. Model Law on Secured Transactions 
in 2016, the Enactment Guide to the U.N. Model Law on Secured 
Transactions in 2017, and the Practice Guide to the Model Law on 
Secured Transactions in 2019. Secured transactions reform in developing 
countries is among the highest priorities of both UNCITRAL and the 
World Bank and the model law is an important instrument in furthering 
the reform efforts. 
The U.S. delegation to Working Group IV of UNCITRAL is part of 
a broader team that attends the meetings, typically a week in Vienna in 
late fall and a week in New York City in mid-spring, under the flags of 
various NGOs. Organizations represented in these negotiations include 
the American Bar Association, the Commercial Finance Association 
(which consists of members engaged in asset-based securitization 
transactions), the International Insolvency Institute, and the National Law 
Center. The team collaborates extensively, both in preparing for the 
meetings and at the meetings. 
The primary job of a government expert is to provide subject matter 
expertise. A great deal of effort goes into preparing for the UNCITRAL 
meetings. The U.N. Secretariat produces a new draft for each meeting, 
based on decisions made at the previous meeting. Those decisions are set 
                                               
90. Id.  
91. Jeffrey D. Forchelli Professor of Law. Professor Cohen is not a commissioner but his ties 
to the ULC run deep. He is a member of and Research Director for the Permanent Editorial Board 
for the Uniform Commercial Code, a frequent member of drafting committees revising articles of 
the UCC (including serving as co-reporter for the 2004 revision of Article 1), and he has served as an 
American Law Institute representative to ULC drafting projects that implicate the UCC in some 
manner, such as the 2015 revisions to the Model Tribal Secured Transactions Act and the Revised 
Uniform Landlord and Tenant Act. Professor Cohen’s service on the U.S. delegation dates back to 
the 1990s when he participated in the development of the U.N. Convention on the Assignment of 
Receivables.  
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out in a report that is produced during the meeting at which they are made 
and approved by the delegates. As delegates prepare for a new meeting, 
they review the report from the previous meeting and the new draft that 
was prepared in light of the report. Suggestions for changes are made to 
the draft. Delegates then hold a series of telephone conferences, often 
lasting for hours, with the full U.S. team (including NGOs) going through 
the draft line by line. All involved make suggestions for drafting clarity 
that are provided privately to the Secretariat rather than publicly 
presenting them on the floor. Delegates, including the non-government 
experts, also make suggestions for substantive changes that the delegation 
hopes to achieve during the next meeting. Sometimes the changes merit 
the preparation of a working paper to be distributed to all delegations 
ahead of the meeting. This approach allows for input from other 
delegations and the opportunity to lobby them to join an effort. ULC 
members might speak on behalf of the U.S. government on certain issues 
in their expertise, and they have the opportunity to learn the positions of 
other State representatives and thereby potentially influence future 
drafting by the ULC.92 
The week-long UNCITRAL meetings are divided into sessions — a 
morning and afternoon session on Monday through Thursday and a 
morning session on Friday. The afternoon session on Friday is reserved 
for the reading and approval of the report of the proceedings. There is 
typically a special Experts Meeting on Saturday to which some experts 
from delegations and NGOs are invited and all government officials are 
excluded. U.S. experts have attended. The purpose of the meeting is to 
help the Secretariat work through the most complicated issues that it will 
have to deal with in the next draft. At the Experts Meeting, those in 
attendance are expected to take off their hats as state delegates and 
provide the best technical advice possible. The Experts Meeting is never 
referred to on the floor of UNCITRAL — because not every delegate is 
invited to attend and official recognition might ruffle some feathers. The 
Secretariat takes advantage of the experts in developing the next draft, 
often sending out advance drafts and asking for input. The drafts are not 
shared with the government delegates. As Henning noted, “we are acting 
on these occasions, with the permission of the United States, as U.N. 
experts.”93 The involvement of recognized experts helps to build 
confidence among domestic constituencies that U.S. interests and 
practices are duly considered in the negotiating process. This process of 
                                               
92. E-mail from William Henning, Life Member, Uniform Law Commission, to Charlotte 
Ku, Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law (Sept. 9, 2018, 10:00 EDT) (on file with 
authors). 
93. Id. 




engagement with experts, stakeholders, and interested parties, including 
the public, occurs as a matter of general practice through the Secretary of 
State’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law that meets on a 
periodic basis.94 
The participation of ULC experts during the negotiations of 
international law conventions and other international instruments 
improves the quality of the conventions and instruments and makes them 
more congruent with existing State law. When it comes to the domestic 
implementation of a convention in an area that is the subject of existing 
uniform State legislation, the ULC’s preferred approach is a collaborative 
effort with the State Department and other affected federal agencies 
resulting in ratification at the federal level but implementation in whole 
or in part at the State level through the development and enactment of a 
uniform law. This approach was used successfully with the Child Support 
Convention but it failed with the Wills Convention. Uniform State 
legislation, however, is only one of the ways in which the ULC can affect 
domestic implementation. Another, and very important method, is 
described below in connection with the discussion of the U.N. 
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables. 
 
A. The United States and Analogues in Other Federal Systems  
 
Although the analysis is confined to the United States, issues of 
subnational implementation are faced in other federal government 
systems. Specifically, Australia, Canada, India, Brazil, and Mexico, to 
name some of the most prominent examples, have multiple levels of 
government below the national level. For example, Canada is divided 
into provinces, each with its own government and sets of responsibilities. 
Like the United States, Canada has the Uniform Law Commission of 
Canada (ULCC), Australia has a federally funded office, and Mexico has 
a Uniform Law Committee. 
The specifics of subnational treaty implementation in those countries 
are unique to the constitutional and other legal parameters found there. 
Nevertheless, a comparison with the United States on several dimensions 
reveals a particularly high bar for achieving subnational implementation 
in the United States. At the outset, the U.S. Constitution requires that no 
treaty be made without the advice and consent of the Senate, and that the 
treaty may be ratified only with concurrence of two thirds of the Senate.95 
That level of support is difficult to achieve under the best of 
                                               
94. See Office of the Legal Adviser, Advisory Committee on Private International Law, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, https://www.state.gov/advisory-committee-on-private-international-law/ (last visited Jan. 1, 
2020). 
95. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
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circumstances, but the polarization of American political parties in the last 
decade, combined with frequent divided partisan rule between the 
executive and Congress, might make this hurdle particularly challenging. 
In contrast, the federal authorities of Canada and Australia have 
evolved practices of coordination among and consultation with their 
subnational units prior to undertaking treaty negotiations. In Canada, 
treaty-making is “a prerogative power that has remained with the 
sovereign, that is, the ‘crown in right of Canada.’” 96 Since 1947, this 
power has been delegated to the Governor General of Canada. The 
Governor General exercises this power on the advice of ministers — 
principally the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in the 
case of treaty making per Section 10 of the Department of Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade Act.97 Treaties do not automatically become the 
law of the land in Canada. If a change in existing law is required, the 
federal or provincial legislatures will need to act “depending on which 
level of government has general legislative competence in the relevant 
field as set out in the constitution.”98 This was underscored in a 1937 Privy 
Council decision generally known as the “Labour Conventions case.”99 
The Canadian federal government begins a consultation process with 
the provinces to identify interested parties and relevant issues when it 
considers entering into a treaty of importance. The level of coordination 
and authorization will depend on the nature of the treaty. For matters of 
national significance that cut across several departments and require 
change to existing law, a policy decision of the Cabinet is required. For 
areas such as mutual legal assistance treaties that fit into existing statutes, 
and do not raise policy issues, the level of authorization is lower. 
Nevertheless, the making of all treaties in Canada requires “formal legal 
authority for their execution.”100 This consultation is overseen by the 
Privy Council Office which has been described as essentially the Prime 
Minister’s department.101 Government departments and agencies may 
also be involved in these initial consultations. 
Once this exploratory phase is completed, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs presents a “Memorandum to Cabinet” to secure political 
endorsement to embark on negotiations. The memorandum “analyzes the 
issues and risks related to the proposed agreement, includes the results of 
any environmental assessments and suggests guidelines for the 
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negotiations. With this information, the Cabinet then finalizes and 
endorses the negotiation mandate.”102 Once negotiations are completed, 
the federal government can commit Canada to an international 
agreement. The power to enter into treaties, however, “did not 
automatically give [the federal government] a right to implement a treaty 
if its subject matter fell within provincial jurisdiction.”103 
Since the mid-1970s, ad hoc federal-provincial committees of deputy 
ministers have been established to serve as a consultation mechanism for 
the negotiation and implementation of treaties like free trade agreements. 
The practice became more permanent in 1986 on conclusion of an 
agreement between federal and provincial authorities to create a 
mechanism for regular consultation among first ministers in order to 
monitor ongoing negotiations. Negotiating positions were also developed 
in consultation with the premiers and provincial trade ministers in the case 
of trade negotiations.104 A similar mechanism for ongoing federal and 
provincial consultation used for officials responsible for human rights. 
When no specific legislation is enacted, the federal government may 
accept assurances from the provinces “deemed sufficient for the federal 
Government to accede to the treaties.”105 
The Canadian federal government, in principle, will not ratify a treaty 
on a subject that falls within provincial jurisdiction until relevant 
provincial implementing legislation is enacted.106 In practice, however, the 
federal Government has three options if a province chooses not to 
participate in a treaty regime. 
First, the federal Government can withhold accession or ratification 
until all provinces enact required legislation. Second, some treaties may 
contain a “federal State” clause that allows the federal State to participate 
on a partial basis, i.e. participation to “the extent to which its political 
subunits have implemented the provisions of a treaty.”107 The final option 
is for the federal State to enter a reservation to the treaty indicating which 
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provinces decline to be bound where the treaty in question permits such 
a reservation although such provisions have become increasingly rare.108  
 The province of Alberta, for example, initially declined to be bound 
by the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. (It has changed its 
position and is now bound.)109 Canada’s system of consultation now also 
includes engaging with the public through parliamentary committees or 
other forms of consultation like the standing external consultative 
committee of the Department of Justice that advises principally on private 
international law treaties. The government is not bound to accept any of 
the advice provided and “the extent to which their recommendations are 
taken into account varies significantly.”110 
In Australia, Section 61 of the Constitution gives the federal executive 
the authority to enter into treaties.111 Parliament, however, retains its 
legislative authority to incorporate treaty provisions into the domestic law 
of Australia.112 In the 1980s, Australian parliamentarians initiated a review 
of Australia’s treaty-making process and specifically the role of the 
legislature in that process. The move was thought in some quarters to be 
unnecessary because Australia had generally followed UK practice where 
no treaties are self-executing. All treaties require domestic implementation 
in order to have legal effect. Nevertheless, by 1996, a series of treaty-
making reforms were enacted to institutionalize notice and consultation 
with parliament and the states as follows:  
 
• The tabling in Parliament of all treaty actions 
proposed by the government for at least fifteen joint 
sitting days before binding treaty action is taken; 
• The preparation of a National Interest Analysis 
(“NIA”) for each treaty, outlining information regarding 
the obligations contained in the treaty and the benefits 
for Australia of entering into the treaty – the NIA must 
be tabled in Parliament and published on the internet; 
• The establishment of the parliamentary Joint 
Standing Committee on Treaties (“JSCOT”), comprising 
sixteen members from government, opposition and 
minority parties, to inquire into and make 
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recommendations in relation to Australia’s entry into 
treaties 
• The establishment of the Treaties Council, 
comprising the Prime Minister, Premiers and Chief 
Ministers and an enhanced role for the 
Commonwealth/state and territory Standing Committee 
on Treaties (“SCOT”) to improve the quality of state and 
territory participation in the treaty-making process, and 
• The establishment of the Australian Treaties 
Library, providing online access to all Australian treaty 
texts.113 
 
In Germany, the treaty-making power is vested in the federal 
government by Basic Law, Articles 32(1), 73(1), 87(1) as “the sole 
institution to handle administrative affairs abroad and conduct diplomatic 
and consular relations.”114 The Basic Law was silent, however, on what 
happens if a treaty touches on subjects within the competence of the 
Laender — the sixteen states that comprise the Federal Republic of 
Germany. This gap was filled by an arrangement concluded between the 
Federal and Land Governments — the governments of the Laender — 
on November 14, 1957, called the Lindau Agreement. That agreement 
acknowledges that there are areas of treaty-making that might be 
exclusively federal. These would include consular treaties, treaties on 
commerce and navigation, and treaties acceding to international 
organizations. Where treaties do touch on matters within the competence 
of the Laender; the agreement sets out a consultation process as follows: 
 
• The Laender shall be informed at the earliest date 
possible of the proposed conclusion of such treaties so 
that they can make their wishes known in good time; and 
• A permanent body of Laender representatives shall 
be set up which shall be available for consultation by the 
Federal Foreign Office or the competent federal ministry 
during negotiations on international treaties.115 
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India is a federal state but has been described as a federal structure 
with unitary features.116 The Constitution of India confers on the federal 
government “the entire field of foreign affairs.”117 The Indian Parliament 
“has exclusive power to legislate on foreign affairs and on all matters 
which bring the Union into relations with a foreign country.”118 For 
treaty-making and implementation, the question then is one of whether 
legislation is required to implement the terms of a treaty and not of what 
level of government (i.e., either federal or state) will implement the treaty. 
In contrast to India, the Confederation of Switzerland is a strong 
federal and highly consultative state where the executive, legislature, and 
Cantons are all involved in shaping external relations and treaty 
negotiation and implementation.119 “[A] consensus with the cantons and 
all interested groups is sought before a treaty is submitted with a view to 
approval and ratification.”120 Mechanisms for consultation have also been 
set up like the Contact Committee made up of the Federal Minister of 
Justice and Police and members of all cantonal governments to focus on 
issues related to the European Union and its repercussions on 
Switzerland. This group has evolved into the Conference of the 
Governments of the Cantons that coordinates cantonal policies and views 
related to cross-border relations.121  
Apart from these constitutional and procedural differences, the 
number of subnational government units that would have to adopt treaty-
implementing legislation can be a significant complicating factor. 
Australia has only six, Canada has ten, Switzerland and Brazil each have 
twenty-six, India has twenty-nine, Mexico has thirty-one, and the United 
States has fifty (not including other subnational units such as Puerto Rico 
and the District of Columbia, along with the non-self-governing 
territories of Guam, the Virgin Islands, and American Samoa). 
The greater number of federal units that must approve, the greater 
the likelihood that full coverage will not be achieved; that is, one or more 
units are likely to choose not to pass the necessary legislation or create 
rules that do not match well with those of other states and provinces. 
Even if all subunits vote to implement the treaty, the time frame under 
                                               
116. K. Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, supra note 
115, at 79. 
117. Id. at 80. 
118. Id. 
119. Luzius Wildhaber, Eva Kornicker, & Adrian Scheidegger, in AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, 
supra note 115, at 126. 
120. THE CONFERENCE OF CANTONAL GOVERNMENTS, 
https://www.eda.admin.ch/missions/mission-eu-
brussels/en/home/organisation/sections/conference-cantonal.html. (last visited Jan. 1, 2020).  
121. Wildhaber et al., supra note 120, at 128. 




which this is all achieved, ceteris paribus, is longer when there are more 
subunits. 
In the United States, despite incentives and established processes, the 
net result could represent something of a patchwork in terms of 
subnational implementation. Some agreements might be fully operational 
at the State level, others might be partly implemented (some States have 
passed the necessary legislation whereas others have not), and other 
treaties remain nearly or completely in non-implementation stage because 
States have not enacted the necessary legislation. What distinguishes these 
groups of outcomes and how might the suboptimal results be redressed? 
These are the subjects of the next sections. 
V. SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN SUBNATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
In this Part, we examine two cases that represent the variation of 
subnational implementation of treaties in the United States. In the short 
term, and the standard adopted here, success is defined as securing 
adoption of legislation by States and then ratification of a treaty at the 
federal level. We acknowledge that a more stringent benchmark would 
involve an evaluation of whether such legislation was effective in meeting 
the goals of the treaty; unfortunately, this would require a long-term 
assessment of agreements and legislation that are in their nascent stage 
and is outside the scope of this Article.  
The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child 
Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance122 can be considered a 
success story in that the United States was able to deposit its ratification 
after each State adopted revisions to the UIFSA, a common set of 
standards that comply with the substantive obligations of the treaty and 
effectively implement them. In contrast, the Convention Providing a 
Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will, more commonly 
known as the Washington Convention,123 is an example in which 
subnational implementation has thus far been unsuccessful as only a 
minority of States has enacted suitable legislation and the agreement has 
not received U.S. ratification. In the Sections below, we review both of 
these agreements and subsequent implementation outcomes. We then 
conclude with some lessons concerning the conditions for success (and 
failure) of subnational implementation. 
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A. The Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other 
Forms of Family Maintenance 
 
The Hague Conference on Private International Law adopted the 
Convention on November 23, 2007, and on that date the United States 
became the first country to sign it. The instrument of ratification was 
deposited on September 7, 2016, and the Convention became effective in 
the United States on January 1, 2017. The Convention establishes “a 
comprehensive system of administrative cooperation among nations with 
respect to support and the adoption of a system for the recognition and 
enforcement of support orders across national boundaries.”124 Successful 
ratification was the culmination of an unprecedented collaborative effort 
involving L/PIL, the ULC, and OCSE. 
In the United States, collection of child support across state 
boundaries is routinely and efficiently accomplished through the UIFSA, 
a product of the ULC. UIFSA was first promulgated in 1992 and was 
amended in 1996 at the time Congress was implementing welfare reform 
through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act. This act amended Title IV of the Social Security Act, 
which authorizes the Child Support Enforcement Program under which 
federal funds are provided to the States to assist with the collection of 
child support, to require that States adopt the 1996 version of UIFSA in 
precisely the form promulgated by the ULC in order to be eligible for 
continued federal funding. This technique, known as conditional 
spending, has been approved by the U.S. Supreme Court subject to certain 
conditions.125 
While UIFSA established a federal U.S. mechanism for the collection 
of child support across State lines, there was an increasing need to collect 
child support across international boundaries. Hence, there was a need to 
craft an international agreement that provided cooperation among 
countries, often with different legal systems. The Child Support 
Convention is not self-executing; rather, it is largely implemented by State 
law with federal law playing a crucial role. L/PIL concluded that 
implementation through federal law would be less than optimal because 
it would require the creation of a new federal bureaucracy to administer 
the collection of child support. Instead, UIFSA was revised in 2008 to 
accommodate international collections under the convention. The Senate 
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gave its advice and consent in 2010, and in 2014 federal law was amended 
to require that States, as a condition of continued federal funding, adopt 
UIFSA 2008 in precisely the form promulgated by the ULC. The 
instrument of ratification was deposited only after each State adopted 
UIFSA 2008. Full State adoption was achieved in early 2016.126 
 
A. The Washington Convention of 1973 (Recognition of International Wills) 
 
The Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an 
International Will, more commonly known as the Washington 
Convention, was promulgated by UNIDROIT in 1973. It deals with a 
common problem — the need for a will prepared pursuant to the 
domestic law of one country to be recognized in another country. To 
achieve this result, the domestic law of a country that is a party to the 
convention must reflect the substantive rules regarding the form (and 
registration) of an international will that are found in the convention. 
Rather than relying on choice-of-law rules to determine whether a will 
created under the laws of one country is effective in another, the 
convention created a national rule under which a will that conforms to 
the requirements of the convention must be recognized in each member 
country. A party to the agreement must introduce into its law the Uniform 
Law on the Form of an International Will that is attached as an Annex to 
the Convention. The convention permits a party to limit its effect to those 
subnational units that pass conforming legislation, but the United States 
declined to take this option.127 
Although it would be possible, legally and practically, for the 
convention to be implemented purely at the federal level, from the 
standpoint of the States this is not desirable. The subject of wills has 
historically been reserved to the States, and the ULC and the State 
Department agreed that it would be best if the States themselves adopted 
the substantive rules of the convention. To that end, the ULC 
promulgated the Uniform Wills Recognition Act in 1977. The act 
incorporates the substantive rules of the convention into the law of an 
enacting State. 
In many ways, this is a suitable companion case to the Hague 
Convention on child support in that the convention addresses a similar 
problem of families living across national boundaries and the associated 
need to coordinate legal processes and recognition of court orders. In the 
case of the Washington Convention, however, implementation through a 
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uniform act can largely be judged a failure to date. The act was adopted 
in fifteen States and the District of Columbia during the twenty years 
following its promulgation, but by the late 1990s enactment efforts had 
essentially ended. The reasons for the cessation of efforts is not entirely 
clear and may relate to the different expectations of the ULC and the State 
Department. 
The ULC considered its efforts sufficiently successful for the 
convention to be submitted to the U.S. Senate. It was thought that Senate 
advice and consent might have encouraged other States to adopt the 
uniform act. At the same time, the State Department was reluctant to ask 
the President to transmit the convention to the Senate (anticipating that 
the Senate would be disinclined to act upon it) without clear assurance 
that the rest of the States would in fact implement its provisions by 
adopting the uniform act. The experience indicates the importance not 
only of having a clear understanding of expectations at the outset of a 
project but also of achieving the necessary basis for U.S. compliance with 
its international obligations. Both considerations were important 
elements in the planning for the child-support convention. The ULC 
revisited the international wills area in 2007 and developed a report 
indicating that ratification of the convention remained in the interests of 
U.S. citizens and that the Uniform Wills Recognition Act was still an 
appropriate vehicle upon which to proceed.128 This gained enactment by 
three more States and the U.S. Virgin Islands in 2009 and 2010 but there 
has been no further activity since then. 
 
A. Lessons for Successful Subnational Implementation of Treaties 
 
How did two very similar treaties produce divergent outcomes in 
terms of subnational implementation by States? It wasn’t necessarily that 
one treaty was in the interests of the States and the other less so. Both 
addressed a clear problem stemming from families located in different 
parts of the world: the validity of legal rulings and documents across 
national borders. Generally, the United States would not have agreed to 
the conventions had there not been strong and clear perceived benefits. 
The difference between the two cases must lie with other conditions. 
The clearest difference was the financial incentives for the States. 
Federal legislation made adoption of UIFSA 2008 a condition of 
continued federal funding of child support recovery efforts. Thus, prompt 
action by a State was in its interest; a failure by any State to act quickly 
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would result in significant penalties. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, 
that the Hague Convention was successful in finding its way into the 
legislation of all States. By contrast, adherence to the Washington 
Convention offered no similar (financial) incentive; indeed, many States 
did not seem to view it as providing a particular benefit (or of resolving a 
particular problem), and therefore saw no cost to inaction. 
These differences had a precipitating and reinforcing effect on 
another key factor: the speed of the subnational implementation process. 
The financial incentives reduced the uncertainty for a given State that 
others would adopt the law and therefore it was easier to take the risk of 
adopting new legislation knowing that others were highly likely to follow. 
The rapid succession of State adoptions also created a cascading effect 
that not only further sped up the process but increased the probability of 
each successive adoption. The Convention on Wills offered no such 
advantage and the movement toward adopting the relevant uniform law 
suffered over time. States became increasingly reluctant to change their 
laws because of their doubts about the ultimate ratification of the 
convention.  
In the case of child support, adoption of the uniform legislation was 
also relatively easy for State legislatures because the Convention’s 
provisions fit snugly with many existing processes and provisions. For 
example, the Convention recognizes U.S. due process. In addition, the 
provisions allow for the challenge of a foreign support order that did not 
include a process involving notice and a hearing. Any foreign orders had 
to comply with U.S. jurisdictional rules. The treaty also requires countries 
to provide free legal assistance in the recognition and implementation of 
existing child support orders, something that is already present in the 
United States. These were reassuring provisions to lawmakers who feared 
foreign laws and practices being imposed on Americans. In 2016, the 
Department of Health and Human Services reported 15.6 million 
individuals served by its Office of Child Support Enforcement and $33 
billion in child support payments collected now, including a portion 
coming from outside the United States.129  
The Convention dealing with child support is the only fully successful 
case of U.S. subnational implementation of an international agreement. 
Despite the ULC’s federal-State endeavors, it is not clear how often the 
conditions for success will be duplicated with respect to other treaties. 
VI. ARE SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES THE SOLUTION? 
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The analyses above suggest that relying on subnational 
implementation, especially in the United States, can be a risky strategy. Is 
there a better way to avoid this step in ensuring the implementation of 
international treaties? 
One possible solution is to adopt treaties on a self-executing basis, so 
that they automatically become part of national law without the need for 
enacting legislation at either the national or subnational levels. As we have 
seen with the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, however, when 
treaty obligations are not transformed into directly enforceable local law, 
implementation can be spotty and incomplete. Furthermore, this is not 
the common approach in recent practice, at least in terms of replacing 
current U.S. law, even without considering whether federalism issues 
arise.130 
In areas in which self-executing agreements are practical, does 
adoption on a self-executing basis necessarily solve the problems noted 
above? As with the previous Part, we offer two examples of self-executing 
agreements, one a success in obviating the need for subnational 
implementation (Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade)131 and the other that has been suboptimal in having 
its intended effect at the subnational level (UN Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods).132 We end this Part with a cautionary 
note about the limitations of self-executing agreements as an alternative 
to subnational implementation. 
 
A. Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade 
 
A lender that takes as security an assignment of its borrower’s 
receivables must be certain that its right to collect from debtors will be 
protected against third parties, including another lender with an interest 
in the receivables as collateral, a buyer of the receivables, an unsecured 
creditor of the borrower, and most notably an insolvency representative 
(trustee in bankruptcy in the U.S. system). The same need exists if a 
person’s receivables are sold, either to a factor or as part of a securitization 
program. The buyer must be protected from the same cast of 
characters.133 
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Many countries have sophisticated laws governing a lender’s or 
buyer’s priority rights. In the United States that law is Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which is a joint product of the ULC 
and the American Law Institute (“ALI”). In Canada, it is the Personal 
Property Security Act (“PPSA”). The UCC and the PPSA are State and 
provincial, rather than federal, law, and an assignee must have certainty as 
to which State’s or province’s law governs priority rights. Under both 
regimes, this certainty is provided by choice-of-law rules designating the 
law of the assignor’s location as the governing law. The choice-of-law 
rules work well for a domestic transaction, but there is a risk in an 
international transaction that a court will choose the law of a country that 
does not have a robust set of rules protecting the interests of assignees. 
The purpose of the Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade is to provide certainty with regard to the governing 
law in international transactions. It was drafted by the U.N. Commission 
on International Trade Law and approved by the U.N. General Assembly 
on December 12, 2001. The Convention has been adopted by Liberia and 
signed by Luxembourg, Madagascar, and the U.S. (on December 30, 
2003). It must be adopted by five nations to enter into force. The U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on the treaty in 
March 2018 and recommended it favorably for advice and consent to the 
full Senate on September 12, 2018. The Senate gave its advice and consent 
on January 2, 2019. The United States deposited the instrument of 
ratification on October 15, 2019. 
The Convention excludes from its scope transactions in securities, 
derivatives and other financial assets, assignments of deposit accounts, 
and assignments of claims under letters of credit and independent 
guaranties. 
It has rules protecting the holders of negotiable instruments and 
assignees of certain real estate lease receivables. Because of these 
restrictions, the Convention primarily applies to assignments of trade, 
loan, and similar commercial and consumer receivables arising in asset-
based lending, factoring, securitization, and project finance transactions. 
The Convention applies only if the assignment or the receivable is 
“international,” meaning that the assignor and assignee are in different 
countries (international assignment) or the assignor and the debtor are in 
different countries (international receivable). Also, in all cases the assignor 
must be in a country that has adopted the Convention. For the debtor’s 
rights and obligations to be affected, the debtor must be located in a 
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country that has adopted the Convention or the contract giving rise to the 
receivable must be governed by the law of a country that has adopted it. 
The Convention was drafted at a time when UCC Article 9 was 
undergoing wholesale revisions, and the State Department appointed to 
its delegation individuals who were involved in the Article 9 revision 
process. Issues raised in negotiating the Convention were considered by 
the Article 9 drafting committee, and issues raised in the Article 9 process 
were considered in negotiating the Convention. This had the salutary 
effect of creating significant harmony between the Convention and 
domestic U.S. law. The main differences between the Convention and 
Article 9 relate to a small subset of the rules that determine which 
jurisdiction’s law governs an assignee’s rights in a receivable. 
A study to determine whether ratification of the Convention would 
be too disruptive of domestic law was undertaken by a committee jointly 
approved by the ULC and ALI, and it was joined by representatives of 
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada and the Uniform Law Center of 
Mexico. There was some consideration of simply harmonizing the laws of 
the three countries with respect to the assignment of receivables, but 
eventually it was determined that each country should become a party to 
the Convention. Consideration was given to amending Article 9 to reflect 
the Convention’s choice-of-law rules for international assignments and 
provisions to that effect were drafted, but the idea was abandoned 
because of concern that gaining enactment in the more than fifty U.S. 
jurisdictions would be difficult and time-consuming and therefore might 
be disruptive of ongoing commercial transactions. 
After making the tentative decision to recommend ratification to the 
Senate, the committee tested the market for the Convention by holding 
open symposia, jointly sponsored by the State Department’s Office of 
Private International Law, in New York and Los Angeles at which the 
rules of the Convention were explained in the context of specific 
hypotheticals. In addition to representatives of a number of major law 
firms, the symposia were attended by representatives of major financial 
institutions such as Bank of America, Citicorp, GMAC, JPMorgan Chase, 
Merrill Lynch, PNC Bank, UBS, Wachovia, US Bank, and Standard and 
Poor’s. The overwhelming reaction was that the choice-of-law differences 
were manageable and that ratification was in the best interests of the 
United States.134  
The committee ultimately prepared a draft of a potential report from 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to the full Senate recommending 
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ratification subject to certain declarations and understandings designed to 
minimize the differences between the Convention and Article 9.135 These 
declarations and understandings were crucial for the Convention to 
function in harmony with domestic U.S. law, and they were the most 
important part of the committee’s work. The committee also prepared a 
draft report containing an article-by-article comparison of the Convention 
and Article 9 for potential submission by the State Department to the 
President. It was understood by all concerned that the Convention would 
be self-executing. 
Although this meant no new State implementing legislation because 
existing law was adequate, the effect of the Convention on State law 
played a significant role in the drafting of the Convention and in the 
ultimate decision to recommend ratification to the U.S. Senate. Without 
the work of the joint ULC-ALI committee, it is not clear that the 
Convention could have moved forward towards ratification. This is 
perhaps the best available model for future State-federal cooperation. 
 
A. Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
 
The 1980 U.N. Convention on the International Sale of Goods 
(“CISG”) serves an important function in trans-border trade by providing 
a uniform, internationally agreed-upon regime for ordinary commercial 
transactions. Specifically, it addresses the legal rules governing the 
formation of contracts for the international sale of goods, the respective 
obligations of the buyer and seller, the passage of risk, and remedies 
available to both parties in case of breach of contract. It applies to sales 
contracts between private parties whose places of business are in different 
states party to the treaty. The aim is to promote certainty in cross-border 
business-to-business dealings by displacing differing (and often 
conflicting) domestic rules that might otherwise be applicable to the 
parties and their contract. Some consider it one of the international 
community's most ambitious and successful efforts to promote efficiency 
and sustained growth of international trade.136 
The United States ratified the CISG in 1986 and it became effective 
domestically on January 1, 1988. Even though the treaty had broad 
support in the U.S. business community, its ratification proved 
controversial for several reasons, among them: (i) U.S. law governing 
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contractual relationships in the United States is almost entirely State 
(rather than federal) law, even though a measure of uniformity has been 
achieved through State adoption of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code; (ii) the CISG’s provisions are often inconsistent with the relevant 
provisions of Article 2, and (iii) there was considerable reluctance to 
permit the federal government to intrude into the traditional role of States 
in the field of ordinary commercial transactions by “federalizing” 
commercial law. 
Rather than implementing the treaty through federal legislation, the 
choice was made to adopt it on a self-executing basis, so that (by virtue 
of the Supremacy Clause), to the extent it applies in a given commercial 
context, it does so directly and overrides inconsistent State law, including 
UCC Article 2, unless the contracting parties explicitly opt out. By 
definition, enforcement of the CISG would fall primarily to the judiciary 
since the treaty would typically come into play when the parties could not 
resolve a dispute and had submitted it to litigation. All U.S. courts – 
federal and State – would therefore be bound to apply the CISG to issues 
raised by international sales contracts covered by the treaty. Since the 
treaty would apply only in cases of disputes under international 
transactions, federal regulation of which falls within Congress’s authority 
under the Commerce Clause, the intrusion into a traditional area of State 
authority was relatively mild. 
The impact of the CISG has indeed been somewhat limited. One 
reason is that contracting parties (and not infrequently the courts 
considering their dispute) are often unaware that the treaty applies to the 
particular transaction.137 As a self-executing treaty, the CISG became 
federal law directly, without being “codified.” As a result, lawyers and 
judges often overlook it in their research and are inclined to default, 
mistakenly, to the relevant State law in their analyses. Moreover, even 
when they are aware that the CISG applies, they frequently struggle with 
the different terminology used in the treaty and the comparative lack of 
interpretive precedent in prior case law, turning in such cases to otherwise 
applicable State law (with which they are more familiar). This 
phenomenon, which is unfortunate but perhaps inevitable, is sometimes 
described as the “homeward trend.”138 
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One recent empirical study indicates that experienced U.S. attorneys 
often advise their clients to opt out of the CISG, which the Convention 
permits. John Coyle’s dataset indicates that “past surveys of U.S. lawyers 
dramatically overstate the extent to which the CISG has gained 
acceptance within the U.S. legal community”139 and “highlight the 
potential unfairness of requiring unsophisticated U.S. companies to 
litigate international contract disputes under a set of treaty rules that are 
routinely avoided by their more sophisticated brethren.”140 
The CISG experience demonstrates both the difficulties that can arise 
when the subject-matter of a treaty is primarily State (rather than federal) 
law and the often-overlooked shortcomings of the “self-execution” 
approach to treaty implementation. It also suggests that leaving treaty 
implementation entirely to the courts (often touted as an optimal “control 
mechanism”) has some drawbacks when it comes to ensuring consistency 
of interpretation and application. 
 
A. Self-Executing Treaties and Their Limitations 
 
At least in the abstract, it would seem that making a treaty self-
executing would be far better than depending on separate legislative 
enactments by fifty States plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
Guam, and the Virgin Islands. Nevertheless, empirically, there are a 
number of caveats or limitations to this. 
First, the idea of a purely self-executing agreement might be illusory. 
As Stewart notes, most treaties that are described as self- executing are 
not and in fact are legislatively implemented.141 With the rise of 
multilateral treaties has come greater complexity, not only because they 
need to be broadly applicable to many parties, but also because the 
subjects of treaties are now more intricate and multifaceted. Additional 
implementing legislation at the national and/or State level becomes 
essential. 
Second, the process of self-execution may work better when the 
primary responsibility for execution and compliance lies at the federal, 
rather than State, level although this was not the outcome with respect to 
CISG. There is also less likely to be political pushback at the State level if 
the subject of the treaty is not highly salient there. Thus, choosing the self-
executing option may be best when such implementation occurs more at 
the federal than the subnational level.  
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Third, and as the CISG example indicates, there is no guarantee that 
self-executing agreements will have their intended effect at the State level. 
In some areas, it appears that treaty law is not applied, not because of 
opposition but because of ignorance on the part of State lawyers and 
judges. Even generally, Stewart notes that the empirical evidence that self-
execution increases compliance with international obligations is lacking.142 
Finally, implementing treaties directly through self-execution rather 
than legislation does not necessarily speed up the process of getting the 
law onto the books. The Receivables Convention was negotiated in 2001 
and, seventeen years later, has not been ratified by the United States, much 
less entered into force even with an unusually low five-party threshold for 
that entry. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
Countries want the treaties they negotiate to be effective in order to 
reap the benefits associated with them. But successfully negotiating a 
treaty and effectively implementing its provisions are different 
undertakings, even if ratification is assured. Some agreements require 
additional implementing legislation at the national and subnational level 
to give them the desired legal effect within those jurisdictions. This is part 
of a broader concern facing international law: rules may be adopted, but 
the legal operating system or infrastructure cannot ensure that they take 
effect. Subnational implementation may fill in some operational gaps, but 
this assumes that countries can and will follow through with appropriate 
legislative actions. For a number of reasons discussed above, this does not 
always occur. 
The problem is more acute for a complex federal system like that of 
the United States where the treaty-making power clearly resides with the 
federal government, but where implementation requires either a political 
decision to pre-empt State law or separate legislative action by the 
constituent States. Over the decades, as multilateral treaty-making has 
moved increasingly into subjects covered by State law, the federal 
government has actively reached out to include representatives and 
experts representing State interests on treaty negotiating delegations.  
Regular consultation has also been instituted through bodies like the 
U.S. Department of State’s Advisory Committee on Private International 
Law consisting of members from private organizations, including bar 
associations, and representatives of federal and State agencies and courts. 
The Advisory Committee also organizes study groups to provide advice 
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on specialized subjects of private international law.143 Organizations 
active on the Advisory Committee are the American Branch of the 
International Law Association, the American Law Institute, the American 
Society of International Law, the Section of International Law of the 
American Bar Association, and the ULC.144 Of this list, only the ULC has 
a primary focus on State interests. 
As we have seen, failure to pass implementing legislation has a 
number of consequences. First, if the prospects of subnational 
implementation are dubious or likely to be incomplete (e.g., if a large 
number of U.S. States are unlikely to adopt the necessary legislation), the 
federal government might be reluctant to negotiate or sign a given 
agreement even if there are benefits for the country; there are reputational 
costs in accepting an agreement if it cannot guarantee implementation 
(and even in negotiating actively but then failing to adhere to a treaty). 
Similarly, foreign governments are likely to be reluctant to be a party with 
the United States if there is no credible commitment that subnational 
implementation will occur. 
A second scenario is that the United States signs an agreement but is 
unable to ratify it because of an inability to secure implementing 
legislation. This would result in no benefits from the agreement since 
other treaty parties would not be obligated vis-à-vis the United States to 
follow the agreement provisions. 
Third, and a variation of the previous situation, the United States 
might ratify the treaty, but still be unable to ensure State-level adoption. 
As has been true in several cases noted above, the U.S. government could 
be held responsible in international courts for performance failure or 
breach of its international obligations even if the federal government 
cannot compel State governments to cooperate. This issue arises in other 
countries with federal systems, but is more pronounced for the United 
States because the number of subnational entities makes adherence 
through normal State legislative processes very difficult. 
How might states avoid the deleterious consequences above when 
subnational implementation of treaties fails? This study examined practice 
in the United States on subnational implementation of treaties, describing 
the process and examining one case of success and one of failure. Clearly, 
the ULC is a major asset for the United States as it provides a familiar, 
respected, and used mechanism for advising and drafting legislation that 
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can then be adopted by fifty States if they so choose. This was the case 
with the 2008 UIFSA that included the provisions of The Hague 
Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other 
Forms of Family Maintenance. 
It is hard to imagine any chance of coordinated legislative action at 
the State level without such a body. Even so, as we saw with the 1973 
Convention Providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an International 
Will (the Washington Convention) success is far from assured with 
respect to international agreements although the ULC produced a 
Uniform Law on the Form of an International Will that was annexed to 
the Convention.145 The ULC has a record of success that includes more 
than three hundred instances of uniform law adoption, but these deal 
almost exclusively with purely internal or domestic concerns and not 
international treaties. At the same time, international efforts to regulate or 
to harmonize activities are increasing in areas of domestic and State law 
within the United States. These include “matters relating to children and 
families; dispute resolution (including international arbitration and 
mediation); judicial cooperation (including the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments); insolvency; finance and banking; 
secured transactions; contract law; electronic commerce; and wills, trusts, 
and estates.”146 
How might the prospects for subnational implementation of treaties 
be improved? This study reviewed the option of self-executing treaties, 
which would obviate the need for subnational implementation. 
Nevertheless, we have seen the limitations to this approach, not the least 
of which were Constitutional restrictions and the possibility that State 
legal officials would unwittingly ignore relevant treaty obligations as 
appears to have occurred in the case of enforcing the provisions of the 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods. This leads us to circle 
back to see what we might conclude from the ULC driven process of 
consultation and drafting.  
Drawing conclusions from a single case of success is risky, but we can 
also learn from the failures that have occurred. Generally, subnational 
implementation is most likely when the following conditions are met: 
 
• Where State laws already largely conform to what a 
treaty provides; that is, where existing subnational law is 
adequate to meet the treaty’s requirements. This exists in 
some areas based on past ULC successes within a purely 
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domestic context, and thus any necessary adjustments 
based on the treaty should be more manageable. If such 
laws are already in place, one might question the need for 
additional action at the State level, specifically to 
implement a treaty, but such implementation ensures that 
the same processes operate for U.S. citizens and 
companies in other countries under an international 
agreement. 
• Early involvement of the ULC and other domestic 
stakeholders in the treaty negotiation process. This 
occurs in some cases, but not all. Such involvement could 
allow U.S. negotiators to craft treaty provisions and 
adjust bargaining positions that most closely correspond 
to State law or which have the best prospects for later 
adoption by States, while still having the treaty serve U.S. 
interests. It is important in most cases for the United 
States government to involve domestic constituencies 
during the negotiations, in order to get a full 
understanding of the problem to be solved, how it’s 
handled in domestic law and practice, and what the legal 
and political limits might be. Still, there is never a 
guarantee that the United States can get all it wants or 
needs during a treaty negotiation. In an international 
community of 194 independent states, with varying legal 
systems, unanimity is rarely achievable and compromise 
is almost always necessary, requiring some adjustment on 
the part of the constituent States of the United States. 
• Delay ratification until after subnational legislative 
adoption has taken place. This approach ensures that 
domestic implementation is effective and that the United 
States doesn’t make commitments internationally that are 
not reflected in individual State practice, which can take 
a long time to reach completion. In the meantime, U.S. 
interests are not served by the treaty as has been the case, 
for example of the Wills Convention. 
 
The structure of the U.S. federal system poses challenges with respect 
to ratification and implementation of treaties, but is the United States 
doomed to suboptimality, i.e. signing treaties that it does not ratify? Is it 
so bad that only some U.S. States adopt uniform acts in support of treaties 
(i.e., is there a significant risk that lack of uniform implementation would 
pose a substantial likelihood that the United States would be found in 
violation of its treaty obligations)? Alternatively, is it so bad that the 
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United States cannot become party to many agreements because it cannot 
figure out how to assure effective domestic implementation? 
Because not all States had adopted the necessary laws, the more 
common outcome with efforts to use uniform acts to implement treaty 
obligations is enactment in some number of States but the United States 
not ratifying the agreement. Julian Ku provides the following list of 
examples: 
 
[T]he Uniform Probate Code, adopted in eighteen [U.S.] 
states, also contains provisions “in harmony with” the 
Hague Convention on the Conflicts of Laws Relating to the 
Form of Testamentary Dispositions. The Uniform Trust 
Code, adopted in nineteen states, has a provision allowing 
a settlor to designate the governing law, and in the absence 
of such designation, providing choice of law rules is 
“consistent with and was partially patterned on the Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their 
Recognition.” And the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement Act, adopted in forty-six states, provides 
that a custody determination can be registered without any 
request for enforcement. As the official comment to this 
section notes, this provision is required by the Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition 
and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and 
Measures of the Protection of Children.147 
 
Because the primary objective of many of these private international 
law conventions is to harmonize and to coordinate important practices 
around the world, a question can be raised as to the value of efforts, such 
as the drafting of uniform acts, to harmonize various legal regimes and to 
minimize differences. Is the effort of producing a study and uniform or 
model act that might be adopted only by some jurisdictions still valuable 
as a step towards helping to conform U.S. and international practices? 
After all, the time it takes to negotiate a treaty and to adopt subsequent 
implementing legislation might change the political circumstances that 
initially compelled a project to completion. As we have seen with the Wills 
Convention, failure to achieve greater enactment may not stem from 
opposition. It simply may no longer be a high enough priority to carry the 
project over the finish line towards levels of enactment that would result 
in the U.S. completing the treaty ratification process. This also suggests 
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that the United States government may want to ensure that the relevant 
domestic constituencies actually believe a treaty is needed before engaging 
in the treaty- making process and that States will subsequently enact the 
necessary legislation to make eventual ratification of an international 
agreement by the United States possible. 
Does the close cooperation between those negotiating the treaties and 
those who have to implement them at the State level help to harmonize 
practice even if formal acts are not adopted and treaties not ratified? As 
noted above, the adoption of international standards is not confined to 
States; municipalities have also adopted measures to implement treaty 
provisions. As Boss suggests: “These may be considered illustrations of 
domestic attempts at international harmonization of the law rather than 
state implementation of international treaty obligations.”148 
Such piecemeal adoption of international treaty obligations 
complicates the international legal landscape but seems unavoidable given 
the political structures in place and the kinds of subject matter now 
subject to international regulation. Although such an approach might 
make the advantages and conveniences of these treaties available to 
individuals in the jurisdictions that accept these provisions, it still places 
U.S. nationals and interests at a disadvantage outside the United States 
where such piecemeal adoption may not be recognized. 
The interests of constituent States of the United States will necessarily 
be involved in treaty implementation because of the nature of the issues 
now subject to international regulation. In order to maintain their 
prerogatives and protect their citizens and interests, States can act through 
processes they control and influence or be subject to federal legislation 
should their failure to do so damage U.S. interests. We have seen where 
and how cooperation between the federal and State governments can take 
place. Only time will tell if these experiences and networks will lead to 
increased levels of cooperation and higher levels of U.S. participation in 
multilateral treaties. This Article shows how and where cooperation has 
occurred and how such cooperation might provide an additional pathway 
towards treaty implementation in the United States. 
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